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I.  INTRODUCTION 
History reveals that the initial steps in the erosion of individual 
rights are usually excused on the basis of an “emergency” or threat 
to the public. But the ultimate strength of our constitutional 
guarantees lies in their unhesitating application in times of crisis 
and tranquility alike.1 
—Judge Walter R. Mansfield 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has come under 
increasing scrutiny since its creation in 2001.  In the 112th Congress alone, 
TSA-related witnesses testified at thirty-eight congressional hearings and 
provided 425 briefings for members of Congress.2  As aptly summarized by 
Charlie Leocha, director of the Consumer Travel Alliance, “[t]o much of the 
flying public, the TSA is a boogeyman . . . .  TSA has become the butt of 
countless jokes.”3  And by most accounts, Leocha is right.  Criticisms of the 
TSA and airport security measures have been lobbed from almost every 
corner imaginable.  The attacks have been full-throated, nonpartisan, and 
increasingly vitriolic.  In fact, it has become commonplace to turn on the 
television or open the newspaper and see the TSA being lambasted in some 
way, shape, or form. 
 
 1.  United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1972) (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
 2.  Joe Sharkey, T.S.A. Skips a Hearing on Terminating the T.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012),  
 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/tsa-skips-house-panel-hearing-on-privatizing-airport-
checkpoint-security.html. 
 3.  Ashley Halsey III, House Members Criticize TSA, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-29/local/35584716_1_tsa-administrator-john-pistole-
airport-security-federal-aviation-security-agency. 
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The stories concerning TSA misconduct have been as shocking as they 
have numerous.  Many of the stories would be comical if they were not true.  
Here are some highlights.  In 2008, in Lubbock, Texas, a woman was forced 
to remove her nipple piercings in the middle of the airport at the insistence 
of TSA agents.4  Again in 2008, a woman’s brassiere underwire set off 
airport metal detectors, and she was forced to remove her bra for closer 
inspection.5  New mother Elizabeth McGarry was forced to taste her own 
breast milk at JFK Airport to assure TSA agents that the bottles did not 
contain poisonous liquids.6  In Lansing, Michigan, TSA agents burst a 
bladder cancer patient’s urostomy bag during the course of a pat-down, such 
that the man had to board his flight covered in his own urine.7 
TSA agents have been criticized for victimizing America’s most 
vulnerable populations, including the sick, the elderly, the handicapped, and 
children.8  Arab- and Muslim-Americans have been routine targets of new 
TSA screening measures.9  It seems that no one is safe from the pervasive 
 
 4.  TSA Forces Woman to Remove Nipple Rings, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-501843_162-3976376.html. 
 5.  Anna Brones, Underwire Bra Dispute Causes Woman to Miss Her Flight, GADLING.COM 
(Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.gadling.com/2008/08/26/underwire-bra-dispute-causes-woman-to-miss-
her-flight/. 
 6.  JFK Airport Security Forces Woman to Drink Own Breast Milk, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 
2002), http://usatoday.com/travel/news/2002/2002-08-09-jfk-security.htm. 
 7.  Harriet Baskas, TSA Pat-Down Leaves Traveler Covered in Urine, NBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40291856/ns/travel-news/t/tsa-pat-down-leaves-traveler-cove 
red-urine. 
 8.  Unfortunately, these stories are not isolated incidents.  See generally TSA Pat-Down Horror 
Stories, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/slideshow/photos-tsa-horror-stories-12186319 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013).  A number of women have complained that they are being selectively 
targeted for enhanced screening in order for TSA agents to get a perverted sneak-peek at their naked 
bodies.  See Olivia Katrandjian, Strip-Searched Grandma Says TSA Removed Her Underwear, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/strip-searched-grandma-says-
tsa-removed-her-underwear/.  Little girls have complained of being victimized.  See Hugo Gye, 
Weeping Four-year-old Girl Accused of Carrying a Gun by TSA Officers After She Hugged her 
Grandmother While Passing Through Security, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2134280/Weeping-year-old-girl-accused-carrying-GUN-
TSA-officers-hugged-grandmother-passing-security.html.  And there have been complaints about the 
way in which the TSA treats disabled passengers.  See Todd Starnes, TSA Searches 3-year-old in 
Wheelchair, Video Shot in 2010, FOX NEWS (Mar. 19, 2012), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/ 
top-stories/tsa-searches-3-year-old-in-wheelchair.html.  Even celebrities have complained about 
being improperly groped by TSA agents.  See Nicki Minaj ‘Fondled’ By Airport Security, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/10/nicki-minaj-
fondled-by-airport-security_n_1662599.html. 
 9.  Muslim-American Group Criticizes TSA Plan as Profiling, CNN JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/04/tsa.measures.muslims/index.html. 
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abuse of authority occurring at the hands of the TSA and its agents.  In fact, 
on June 1, 2012, CNN posted an article asking a question reverberating in 
the collective American consciousness: “How much do we really hate the 
TSA?”10  The ACLU reported receiving over 900 complaints about TSA pat-
downs in a single month.11  Between October 2009 and June 2012, the TSA 
contact center received 39,000 complaints—averaging close to forty 
complaints every single day of the year.12  America’s faith in the TSA is 
swiftly eroding.  As Charlie Leocha explained,13 the TSA is truly becoming 
a joke—or worse, an abusive show of authority to which everyone who 
wishes to board an airplane must submit.  
People are fighting back against the TSA, however, and the fight has 
been taken to the courts.  Numerous lawsuits have been filed alleging a 
number of legal violations.  From battery charges to constitutional 
challenges, the TSA is under siege.  These challenges have come from many 
quarters: racial-justice advocates who believe that the TSA engages in 
unconstitutional profiling;14 women’s-rights advocates who believe that TSA 
screening often amounts to nothing more than sexual harassment;15 and 
civil-liberties advocates who believe that the TSA infringes on basic 
constitutional rights.16  The number of legal issues embroiled in TSA 
screening is growing so rapidly that the TSA’s Office of the General 
Counsel released an article detailing the legality of TSA security measures.17  
The TSA even maintains a blog for the purpose of emphasizing the 
 
 10.  Jamie Gumbrecht, How Much Do We Really Hate the TSA?, CNN TRAVEL (June 2, 2012),  
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-01/travel/travel_tsa-complaints_1_pat-downs-tsa-agents-national-
opt-out-day?_s=PM:TRAVEL. 
 11.  Over 900 TSA Complaints in Nov., ACLU Says, THE RAW STORY (Nov. 26, 2010), 
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/11/26/aclu-recieves-900-complaints-tsa-screenings/; Passengers’ 
Stories of Recent Travel, ACLU.ORG, http://www.aclu.org/passenger-stories-recent-travel/ (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 12.  Halsey, supra note 3. 
 13.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 14.  Amardeep Singh, TSA Can and Should Take Action to Address Concerns of Racial Profiling, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y (Feb 15, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/tsa-can-and-
should-take-action-to-address-concerns-of-racial-profiling. 
 15.  Female Passengers Say They’re Targeted by TSA, CBS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/02/03/female-passengers-say-theyre-targeted-by-tsa/. 
 16.  ACLU Sues DHS over Unlawful TSA Searches and Detention, ACLU.ORG (June 18, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-sues-dhs-over-unlawful-tsa-searches-and-detention. 
 17.  Jennifer S. Ellison & Marc Pilcher, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Deployment: Legal 
Challenges and Responses, 24 THE AIR & SPACE LAW. 4 (2012). 
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legitimacy of its security program.18 
To be fair, the TSA was created during a politically charged time as a 
forceful reaction to a renewed fear of air terrorism.  Although airport 
security has been commonplace since the 1970s, the TSA was created in 
response to the failure of such security measures—a failure that resulted in 
the deaths of over 3000 people in the September 11th terrorist attacks.  As 
such, the TSA was given the heavy responsibility of protecting the skies and 
assuaging American fear, with no clear parameters on how best to achieve 
this goal.19  The TSA, therefore, had to essentially improvise, protecting the 
airways as best seen fit.  The Executive and Congress gave the TSA carte 
blanche to protect safety.20  Unfortunately, many feel that the TSA has gone 
too far—that current security measures are no longer just an inconvenient 
incident of modern air travel, but have infringed on travelers’ most personal 
rights of privacy. The issues implicated by TSA screening measures are 
larger than convenience or complaints of harassment.  The constitutional 
issues at stake here are of utmost importance—the TSA’s security measures 
may seriously infringe upon passengers’ most basic privacy rights.  And 
privacy is central to the Constitution—three out of the ten amendments in 
the Bill of Rights protect a citizen’s privacy interests from government 
intrusion;21 “the writing and ratification of the Bill of Rights manifested a 
hatred and fear of the federal government.”22  As one of the greatest 
champions of the Bill of Rights, Justice Louis Brandeis, put it, the Bill of 
Rights most importantly conferred the right, “as against the government . . . 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized men.  To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the [Constitution].”23  The “right to 
be let alone” described by Justice Brandeis is not just central to the 
Constitution but central to civility.  And while this right must of course give 
way in some circumstances, supporters of the Bill of Rights would argue that 
 
 18.  See generally THE TSA BLOG, http://blog.tsa.gov/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 19.  49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e), 44901(a), 44902(a), 44904(a) (2012). 
 20.  49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2012). 
 21.  The First Amendment protects privacy of belief, U.S. CONST. amend. I; the Third 
Amendment protects the privacy of the home, U.S. CONST. amend. III; and the Fourth Amendment 
protects the privacy of the person and the home, U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22.  George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill 
of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 179 (2001).  
 23.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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this right should not be cast aside lightly, and when it is cast aside, it should 
be done with exacting scrutiny.  
If privacy is central to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the airport 
is quickly becoming a place of constitutional exceptionalism.24  It has 
become clear in the government’s approach to airport security screening that 
air safety trumps all; the unparalleled danger posed by air terrorism 
supersedes fundamental constitutional rights.  In responding to emergencies 
during three different presidencies, the Executive Branch has essentially said 
that the Constitution, as developed and applied in other settings, has a 
different, less prominent role in the airport.25  The increasing and ever-
morphing threat posed by air terrorism justifies the increasing intrusions on 
travelers’ personal liberties.  And given the magnitude of the threat posed by 
skyjacking and air terrorism, air travelers are supposed to passively submit, 
mollified by the fact that the intrusion on their liberty is for their protection.  
The tension between national security and individual privacy has been 
well documented in the legal community.  For example, after the passage of 
the Patriot Act, much attention was given to the surveillance methods now 
allowed by the government and the resultant intrusion on individual 
privacy.26  In fact, scholars have lamented the increasing lack of privacy in a 
post-9/11 world.27  Yet despite the broader exploration of the national 
security versus civil liberties debate by the academy, legal scholarly 
discourse has largely foregone the exploration of constitutional rights in the 
 
 24.  See Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 230 (2012).  The 
concept of exceptionalism was first fully explored by John Locke, the father of classical liberalism; 
Locke grappled with the idea that some residual power needs to reside with the Executive in order 
for it to effectively deal with emergency situations not fully accounted for by present day laws.  As 
Locke explained, “[m]any things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those 
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands.”  Thomas 
Poole, Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law 3 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political 
Sci., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 14/2008, 2008), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
24596/1/WPS2008-14_Poole.pdf.  As further explained by Locke, it is impossible “to foresee, and 
so by laws provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public . . . therefore there 
is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not 
prescribe.”  Id.  Thus, in times of peril, the Executive needs leeway to respond accordingly. 
 25.  Luna, supra note 24, at 241–44. 
 26.  See, e.g., Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy 
Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 392 (2002); Ethan Carson Eddy, Privatizing 
the Patriot Act: The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal Protectionists As Terrorists, 22 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 261 (2005). 
 27.  See, e.g., Derek M. Alphran, Changing Tides: A Lesser Expectation of Privacy in a Post 
9/11 World, 13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 89, 145 (2009). 
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airport, seemingly accepting the ascendancy of national security in this 
particular theater.28  Despite the centrality of air travel to everyday 
existence—in 2011 U.S. residents logged 1.5 billion personal trips via 
air29—scholarship regarding the TSA, airport security measures, and the 
resultant constitutional implications is scarily scant.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has still not fully defined what the Constitution looks like in the 
airport, despite the constant complaints against the TSA.30  This article 
hopes to shed some light on a shadowed area of vital importance.  
By exploring the Constitution in a post-TSA airport, this article explores 
what constitutional rights look like for the average American who travels by 
air.   Part I of the article details airport security, exploring the origins of 
modern-day security measures, looking at the creation of the Transportation 
Security Administration, and outlining what security measures are currently 
in force at the airport.  Part II of the article looks at the Fourth Amendment 
in the airport, asking how much one’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures yields to national security.  And Part III of the article 
looks at the First Amendment and how much leeway one has in protesting 
the airport security measures currently in place.  Throughout the article, one 
overarching theme should become apparent: in the search for security in the 
air, constitutional rights in the airport have been effectively eviscerated.  
II.  AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES 
A.  The Origin of Airport Security31 
Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations.  Most 
 
 28.  This article builds on the work of the companion pieces authored by Professors Erik Luna, 
supra note 24, and Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting “Special Needs” Theory Via Airport Searches, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1513 (2012).  It also draws upon the notes and comments authored by Jennifer 
LeVine, Over-Exposed? TSA Scanners and the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 16 J. TECH. L. 
& POL’Y 175 (2011); Tobias W. Mock, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment 
Implications of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 213 (2009); and Rebekka Murphy, Routine Body Scanning in Airports: A Fourth 
Amendment Analysis Focused on Health Effects, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915 (2012). 
 29.  U.S. Travel Ass’n, U.S. Travel Answer Sheet, POWEROFTRAVEL.ORG (June 2012), 
http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/page/2009/09/USTravelAnswerSheet_June2012.pdf. 
 30.  Luna, supra note 24, at 245.  
 31.  Much of the history recited in this section is taken from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).  All information has been independently 
verified, and citations of the original sources are therefore provided herein. 
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countries, including the United States, found effective means of 
dealing with piracy on the high seas a century and a half ago.  We 
can—and we will—deal effectively with piracy in the skies today.32 
—Richard Nixon 
Newton’s third law of motion can be boiled down to this basic 
principle—every action has a reaction.  Modern airport security measures 
are perfect evidence of Newton’s theory.  Although the TSA has long 
dominated the conversation about airport security, modern airport security 
was in place long before the TSA was even conceptualized.  Therefore, to 
fully understand current airport security measures and their implications for 
constitutional rights, it is important to retrace the history of airport security 
measures.  Contrary to popular belief, the security measures and policies 
adopted by the TSA already had a solid foundation in the form of decades-
old policy.  And much like current TSA security measures, modern airport 
security was born of a reaction to criminal behavior. 
On May 1, 1961, Antulio Ramirez Ortiz committed America’s first 
skyjacking.33 Ortiz, a Korean War veteran, boarded National Airline Convair 
440 going from Marathon to Key West, Florida with a knife and gun, and 
demanded the plane be diverted to Cuba.34  As a result, on September 5, 
1961, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to make aircraft 
piracy a federal offense.35  Despite the federal criminalization of hijacking 
commercial aircraft, between 1961 and 1968, on average, one American 
airplane was hijacked a year.36  In 1968, the number of skyjackings increased 
dramatically—there were eighteen attempted aircraft hijackings.37  The trend 
continued in 1969, which saw forty attempted hijackings, during thirty-three 
of which the skyjacker was successful in taking over the plane.38 
 
 32.  Statement Announcing a Program to Deal With Airport Hijacking, 1 PUB. PAPERS 742 (Sept. 
11, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2659. 
 33.  Jane Engle, Aviation Security: Flight Attendant Aboard Aircraft Hijacked in 1961 Kept Her 
Career on Course, L.A. Times (June 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/11/news/la-trb-
hijacking-flight-attendant-20110611. 
 34.  See Davis, 482 F.2d at 897; Patrick Weidinger, Top 10 US Airline Hijacking of the Sixties, 
LISTVERSE.COM (Oct. 27, 2012), http://listverse.com/2012/10/27/top-10-us-airline-hijackings-of-the-
sixties.  
 35.  Act of Jan. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466–68. 
 36.  See Davis, 482 F.2d at 898; Weidinger, supra note 34. 
 37.  Id. at 898. 
 38.  Davis, 482 F.2d at 898. 
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This explosion of airway piracy prompted the United States government 
to act.  On September 11 (what has now become an ominous date in 
American aviation history), 1970, President Nixon introduced to the public 
“A Program to Deal with Airplane Hijacking.”39  In creating the program, 
President Nixon heroically declared: “The menace of air piracy must be 
met—immediately and effectively.”40  Accordingly, in an effort to show that 
the government still had control over the air, President Nixon ordered a 
number of measures to ensure airport safety, including: (1) placing federal 
law enforcement officials on American airplanes; (2) using “electronic 
surveillance equipment and other surveillance techniques” in American 
airports; and (3) requiring the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and 
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Office of Science and Technology, and other agencies to 
accelerate their efforts to develop security measures.41  President Nixon also 
ordered federal agencies to determine whether using military-grade metal 
detectors in airports could help ensure safety.42 
In line with the President’s marching orders, by September 1971, the 
FAA proposed a rule requiring all air carriers to submit a screening program 
to the agency for its approval.43  On February 1, 1972, the FAA required air 
carriers to adopt and implement an acceptable screening system “to prevent 
or deter the carriage abroad [sic] its aircraft of sabotage devices or weapons 
in carry-on baggage or on or about the persons of passengers.”44  Under this 
new rule, all airline passengers had to submit to FAA approved screening 
measures, which included: “behavioral profil[ing], magnometer [checks], 
identification check[s], [and] physical search[es].”45 
In July 1972, President Nixon announced another rule to keep the 
airways safe: the screening of all airline passengers and inspection of all 
 
 39.  See supra note 32. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Aviation Security: Airports, 36 Fed. Reg. 19173 (Sept. 30, 1971) (to be codified at 14 
C.F.R. pt. 121); see also Aviation Security: Certain Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 19172 (Sept. 30 1971) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107) (directed at airport operators). 
 44.  Aircraft Security; Screening Systems, 37 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2500 (Feb. 2, 1972) (to be codified 
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121). 
 45.  See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Press Release No. 
72-26, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Feb. 6, 1972)). 
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carry-on bags on “shuttle-type” flights.46  And again, following the 
President’s lead, the FAA issued a directive on August 1, 1972, that “no 
airline ‘shall permit any person’ meeting [a specific] profile to board a plane 
unless his carry-on baggage had been searched and he had been cleared 
through a metal detector or had submitted to a ‘consent search’ prior to 
boarding.”47  The FAA had by then developed a skyjacker profile to help 
security personnel identify passengers who should be required to undergo 
targeted screening.48  Although the details of the skyjacker profile were kept 
secret,49 it has been said that the profile had an “ethnic component” and it 
focused on “unsuccessful” members of society, who appeared to be “lacking 
in resourcefulness, . . .  ha[d] substantial feelings of helplessness or 
hopelessness, and perhaps w[ere] suicidal.”50  
But the FAA soon abandoned the selective profiling approach to 
securing air safety and decided to cast an all-encompassing net.  On 
December 5, 1972, it announced a rule requiring airports to implement 
searches of all carry-on items and magnometer screening of all airline 
passengers by January 5, 1973.51  These new “routine” screening measures 
were to be conducted by airline personnel, but in the presence of armed law 
enforcement officers who were “[a]uthorized to carry and use firearms,” and 
“[v]ested with a police power of arrest under Federal, State, or other political 
subdivision authority.”52 
In sum, President Nixon responded to an increasingly serious concern 
with what some would call proportionately heavy-handed security measures.  
The potential carnage that can arise from a skyjacking is unparalleled.  The 
number of people both in the air and on the ground that are put at risk by 
skyjacking is uniquely perilous.  Therefore, when skyjacking became an all 
too common phenomenon, President Nixon acted swiftly in order to curb a 
 
 46.  See id. at 901 n.23 (quoting The Administration’s Emergency Anti-hijacking Regulations: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong. 68 (1973) 
(statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation)). 
 47.  See id. at 901 (citing Press Release No. 72-72, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Aug. 1972)). 
 48.  See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082–85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 49.  Stephen E. Hall, A Balancing Approach to the Constitutionality of Drug Courier Profiles, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 1007, 1010 n. 25 (1993) (citing Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1080, 1083). 
 50.  Curt R. Bartol & Anne R. Bartol, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 90 (3d ed. 
2012).  
 51.  See Davis, 482 F.2d at 901–02 n.25 (citing Press Release No. 103-72, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
(Dec. 5, 1972)). 
 52.  Law Enforcement Officers, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,934, 24,934 (proposed Dec. 6, 1972) (to be 
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). 
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new crime wave that had potentially catastrophic consequences.  It was at 
this point, in the early 1970s, that American air travel first required 
submission to government-mandated searches.  And with that, modern 
airport security as we know it was born.  
B.  Creation of the TSA 
On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability—even to 
threats that gather on the other side of the Earth.  We resolved then, 
and we are resolved today, to confront every threat from any 
source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.53  
—George W. Bush 
 
There were relatively few developments in airport security measures 
between the 1970s and the 2000s.  During that time period, airport security 
became embedded in both local and international air travel.  However, thirty 
years after airport security screening was introduced into American airports 
and accepted by American air travelers, America’s airways were under siege 
once again.  This time, however, it was on a larger scale than anyone could 
have ever imagined.  
On the morning of September 11, 2001, Islamist extremist organization 
Al-Qaeda coordinated the skyjacking of four American planes leaving from 
New York City and Washington, D.C. airports.54  At approximately 9:00 
a.m., the skyjackers flew two planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and 
United Airlines Flight 175, into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, 
eventually causing both towers to collapse two hours later.55  Thirty minutes 
later, the skyjackers flew American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon, the 
hub of America’s defense.56  The results were devastating—close to 3,000 
people died in the attacks.57  And in an instant, the collective safety felt by 
 
 53.  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat (Oct. 7, 
2002). 
 54.  See, e.g., Look Back at How September 11 Unfolded, CNN (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/us/2011/09/07/natpkg-911-aircheck-timeline.cnn.html. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id.  The last plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania, as the skyjacker had purportedly been 
overcome by the passengers on the plane.  Id. 
 57.  9/11 Commemorations and Memorials, USA.GOV (last updated Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/History-American/September11.shtml. 
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American air travelers evaporated.  
Much like Nixon in the 1970s, President George W. Bush responded 
strongly and immediately.  Less than a month later, on October 8, 2001, 
President Bush signed Executive Order 13,228.58  The order established the 
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council; the 
mission of the agencies was clear: “to develop and coordinate the 
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United 
States from terrorist threats or attacks.”59  The Office of Homeland Security 
was designed to detect, prevent, and protect the country from future terrorist 
attacks.60 
In another response reminiscent of President Nixon in the 1970s, 
President Bush explicitly promised the American public the safety of air 
travel.  On November 19, 2001, he signed into law the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA).61  The ATSA, in important part, 
created the Transportation Security Administration within the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.62  When signing the ATSA into law, 
President Bush unapologetically trumpeted new airport security measures as 
“permanent and aggressive steps to improve the security of our airways.”63  
He made it clear that the September 11th terrorist attacks were a catalyst for 
federal action, and now that the federal government was firmly in control of 
air safety “[s]ecurity comes first.”64  President Bush promised that, in this 
time of crisis, “[a]dditional funds will be provided for federal air marshals, 
and a new team of federal security managers, supervisors, law enforcement 
officers, and screeners will ensure all passengers and carry-on bags are 
inspected thoroughly and effectively.”65  Finally, with the signing of the 
ATSA and the subsequent creation of the TSA, President Bush declared that 
this new security regime “should give all Americans greater confidence 
 
 58.  Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2012)). 
 62.  Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 115.  The TSA was later transferred to fall under 
the authority of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.  See What is TSA?, TRANSP. 
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/what-tsa (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 63.  George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Aviation Security Bill (Nov. 19, 2001) (transcript 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushtext_-
111901.html). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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when they fly.”66 
The tone of President Bush’s statement was clear—the safety of 
American airways was paramount.  The security measures in place before 
September 11th were insufficient, and the federal government was going to 
exercise the full extent of its powers to ensure that the events of that tragic 
day never happened again.  President Bush reassured the American public in 
strong and unequivocal terms.67  Thus, when President Bush signed into law 
the bi-partisan ATSA, the federal government effectively seized control of 
airport security by creating the Transportation Security Administration.68  
The TSA’s mission was extremely broad and tellingly ambiguous: to 
“[p]rotect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of 
movement for people and commerce.”69  John Magaw was appointed by 
President Bush as the first Administrator of the TSA while the Senate was in 
recess,70 and with that, the TSA was operational. 
The goal of the TSA was clear: ensure the safety of American air 
travel.71  Exactly how the TSA was going to achieve this goal went 
decidedly unspoken.  
C.  Current Screening Policies and Measures 
I understand people’s frustrations with [the TSA].  But I also know 
that if there was an explosion in the air that killed a couple of 
hundred people . . . and it turned out that we could have prevented 
it possibly . . . that would be something that would be pretty 
 
 66.  Id.  It is important to note the effect that September 11th had on the airline industry in 
general.  It is estimated that the airline industry lost approximately $1.1 billion, a tenth of projected 
revenue, because of September 11th.  See Garrick Blalock et al., The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport 
Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel, 50 J.L. & ECON. 731, 735 (2007).  Therefore, from 
a financial standpoint, drastic measures needed to be taken to revitalize the airline industry.  
 67.  Bush, supra note 63. 
 68.  See, e.g., Molly Selzer, Federalization of Airport Security Workers: A Study of the Practical 
Impact of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act from a Labor Law Perspective, 5 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 363 (2003). 
 69.  Mission, Vision and Core Values, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/about-
tsa/mission-vision-and-core-values (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 70.  Nick Anderson, Bush Fills Security Job, Skirts Senate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/08/news/mn-21161. 
 71.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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upsetting to most of us—including me.72 
—Barack Obama 
 
In order to carry out its goal of protecting American air safety, the TSA 
issues and administers Transportation Security Regulations,73 which the TSA 
Administrator is then charged with implementing.74  Congress, through the 
ATSA, gave the TSA wide latitude in implementing security measures, 
declaring generally that the TSA “shall provide for the screening of all 
passengers and property . . . that will be carried aboard a passenger 
aircraft.”75  Congress also directed the TSA to give “high priority to 
developing, testing, improving, and deploying [technology] at airport 
screening checkpoints” that will detect weapons and explosives “in all 
forms, on individuals and in their personal property.”76  And on the basis of 
these broad directives, the TSA implements its regulations.77  Furthermore, 
Congress left to the TSA the power to prescribe its own Standard Operating 
Procedures, which are not made available to the public.78 
With sweeping goals and little direction, it is unsurprising that the TSA 
has come under fire for the security programs it has administered.79  The 
following section looks at the TSA regulations presently in force, 
particularly those relating to searches and seizures at airport security 
checkpoints.  It also looks at the current screening measures, detailing what 
exactly a passenger must submit to in the airport screening area. 
1.  Regulations 
The section of the TSA regulations entitled “Responsibilities of 
Passengers and Other Individuals and Persons,” contains the TSA’s rules 
 
 72.  Thomas M. DeFrank, President Barack Obama on TSA Airport Patdowns: Better Safe than 
Sorry, but Policy Will Evolve, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/politics/president-barack-obama-tsa-airport-patdowns-better-safe-policy-evolve-article-
1.456933. 
 73.  Security Regulations, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/security-
regulations (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 74.  49 C.F.R. § 1502.1(a) (2012). 
 75.  49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2012). 
 76.  See id. § 44925(a). 
 77.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 28. 
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regarding what air travelers must do to comply with TSA regulations.80  The 
regulations, in pertinent part, make it unlawful for a passenger to present any 
fraudulent or falsified records at a security checkpoint81 or to tamper with or 
circumvent airport security.82  The section also importantly provides that 
passengers are prohibited from carrying weapons, explosives, and 
incendiaries,83 and cannot, in any manner, interfere with airport security 
personnel.84  Finally, relevant in this particular section of the regulations, any 
person wishing to enter a “sterile area” or board an aircraft must submit to 
screening and inspection of his or her person and property, and must provide 
identification detailing his or her full name, date of birth, and gender.85  
Without submitting to this process, per TSA regulations, a person is not 
permitted to board an aircraft.86 
In regards to airport security, TSA regulations state that an airport 
operator must “provide[] for the safety and security of persons and property 
on an aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air transportation 
against an act of criminal violence, aircraft piracy, and the introduction of an 
unauthorized weapon, explosive, or incendiary onto an aircraft.”87  The 
regulations go on to detail the security measures required to be implemented 
by airport operators in order to gain the TSA’s mandatory approval.88  Under 
the TSA regulations, each airport operator is required to have a secured area 
which “[p]rovide[s] for detection of, and response to, each unauthorized 
presence or movement in, or attempted entry to, the secured area.”89  This 
section also gives extensive direction as to the background checks required 
of airport and aircraft personnel,90 and further requires all airport security 
operators to have adequate support from official law enforcement 
personnel.91  
The section of the regulations entitled “Aircraft Operator Security: Air 
 
 80.  49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.101–.117 (2012). 
 81.  See id. § 1540.103. 
 82.  See id. § 1540.105(a)(1). 
 83.  See id. § 1540.111(a). 
 84.  See id. § 1540.109. 
 85.  See id. § 1540.107. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See id. § 1542.101(a)(1). 
 88.  See id. 
 89.  See id. § 1542.201(b)(2). 
 90.  See id. § 1542.209. 
 91.  See id. § 1542.219. 
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Carriers and Commercial Operators,” provides further detail on the security 
measures necessary at commercial airports.92  Per TSA regulations, airports 
must have in place TSA approved security measures that prevent and deter 
carrying explosives, weapons, or incendiaries by individuals and property 
within their control and any baggage submitted for transport.93  An airport 
operator cannot allow a person into a sterile area and must refuse to transport 
any person who does not submit to the TSA approved screening process.94  
This section of the regulations allows for the use of metal detection devices, 
x-ray systems, and explosive-detection systems, but only when approved by 
the TSA.95  The regulations do not provide specific detail as to what security 
screening systems are required to be used where—nor do they provide 
significant detail as to what is necessary for the obligatory TSA approval. 
The “Secure Flight Program” was also created by the Transportation 
Security Regulations.96  Secure Flight is a “behind-the-scenes program that 
enhances the security . . . of air travel” by crosschecking passengers’ names 
against government watch lists.97  Under the program, before a person can 
travel, the airline must submit the person’s name, date of birth, and gender to 
the TSA.98  If a person is on a “No Fly List,” airlines are prohibited from 
issuing the person a boarding pass and he or she is not allowed to enter the 
sterile area of the airport or to travel by plane.99  The regulations do not 
provide any information on how one comes to arrive on a “No Fly List,” but 
does detail a redress process whereby persons can contest their inability to 
travel under the program.100 
Finally, it is important to note that these regulations are not toothless 
mandates or advisory rules.  The TSA was given broad enforcement powers 
with steep penalties to assist in enforcing its regulations.101  The TSA not 
 
 92.  See id. pt. 1544. 
 93.  See id. §§ 1544.201, 1544.203, 1544.207. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See id. §§ 1544.211, 1544.213. 
 96.  See id. pt. 1560; John S. Pistole, Secure Flight: November 1st Marks End of Grace Period 
for Airlines, THE TSA BLOG (Oct. 26, 2010), http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/10/talk-to-tsa-secure-flight-
november-1st.html. 
 97.  Secure Flight Program, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN. (last updated May 3, 2013), 
http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105 (2012). 
 100.  See id. §§ 1560.201–.207. 
 101.  See id. § 1503. 
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only has the power to issue administrative orders such as warning notices 
and letters of correction, but also has the ability to assess civil penalties in 
amounts ranging from $10,000 to $400,000.102  Moreover—although the 
TSA does not have the power to arrest individuals—because airport-
screening personnel must work in tandem with law enforcement as required 
by TSA regulations, arrest is always a viable option.103  
Even after reading the TSA’s implementation regulations, however, it is 
still not precisely clear how the TSA is going above and beyond to ensure 
the safety of American travel.  The TSA announced broad rules, making it 
unlawful to interfere with security personnel or circumvent security 
procedures and commanding that security operators must screen passengers 
and their belongings—but what these rules actually require is not 
specified.104  The TSA security measures are further obfuscated by the fact 
that TSA Standard Operating Procedures are not available to the public at 
large, such that the general public has no idea what TSA personnel can or 
cannot do pursuant to official agency policies and regulations.105  This lack 
of transparency presents two major problems: (1) passengers are left 
unaware of their rights in relation to TSA officials; and (2) TSA personnel 
could be acting pursuant to unlawful operating procedures, exposing 
themselves to potential liability.  
Because information about the security measures followed by TSA 
agents is largely unavailable to the public, the next section attempts to piece 
together the security measures currently in place at airport security 
checkpoints. 
2.  Screening Procedures  
Of all the screening measures currently in place,106 the most 
 
 102.  See id. § 1503.401. 
 103.  See, e.g., John Marzulli & Corky Siemaszko, Peanut Butter-loving Flier Seeks $5 Million 
from TSA Worker and Port Authority Cop for Putting Him in Sticky Situation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/peanut-butter-lover-seeks-5m-airport-jam-
article-1.1258474. 
 104.  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.105(a)(1), 1540.109, 1544.201, 1544.203, 1544.206 (2012). 
 105.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 106.  The TSA has adopted a security program which has been dubbed the “21 Layers of 
Security.”  Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Advanced Imaging 
Technology Full Body Scanners for Airline Passenger Security Screening, 8 J. HOMELAND 
SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT., no. 1, art. 30, 2011 at 8.  Fifteen of the twenty-one layers are pre-
boarding aircraft security, which includes: intelligence, international partnerships, customs and 
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controversial is undoubtedly Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) 
scanning.  In 2007, AIT units were slowly introduced into airports.107   AIT 
units provide “full-body imaging,” which, according to the TSA, can “detect 
a wide range of threats to transportation security in a matter of seconds to 
protect passengers and crews.”108  The way the technology works is that 
millimeter wave or backscatter technology bounces electronic waves off the 
body to produce negative-like, black and white, three-dimensional images109 
showing the folds and contours of the person’s body, including genitalia.110  
“AIT scanners are able to screen beneath passengers’ clothing to produce an 
image of their bodies, revealing both metallic and nonmetallic items.”111  
At first, AIT units were employed solely as enhanced secondary 
screening apparatuses.112  A person would only have to submit to AIT 
scanning after they passed through and triggered the standard magnetometer 
(metal detector).113  However, pursuant to no codified regulation or formal 
rule,114 in early 2010 the TSA decided to abandon metal detectors and use 
AIT scanners as the primary screening measure, unilaterally concluding that 
AIT scanners would be more successful in detecting potential threats than 
previously existing screening measures.115  This change was also in large 
part a reaction to a criminal threat.116 
On Christmas Day in 2009, “Underwear Bomber” Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab was able to board a Northwest Airlines flight with plastic 
 
border protection, joint terrorism task force, no-fly list and passenger pre-screening, crew vetting, 
Visible Intermodal Protection Response Teams, canines, behavioral detection officers, travel 
document checker, checkpoint/transportation security officers, checked baggage, transportation 
security inspectors, random employee screening, and bomb appraisal officers.  Id.  The other six 
layers are in-flight security, which includes: Federal Air Marshal Service, federal flight deck 
officers, trained flight crew, law enforcement officers, hardened cockpit doors, and passengers.  Id. 
 107.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 3. 
 108.  Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Traveler’s Guide, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN. (Dec. 
18, 2012), http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait. 
 109.  Id.; see Sarah Gonzalez, New Airport Security Rules Cause Traveler Discomfort, NPR (Nov. 
15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/11/15/131328327/new-airport-security-rules-cause-traveler-disc 
omfort; LeVine, supra note 28, at 187–88. 
 110.  Gonzalez, supra note 109. 
 111.  LeVine, supra note 28, at 177. 
 112.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 3. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See id. at 4. 
 115.  Id. at 3. 
 116.  See Indictment, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005 (E.D. Mich. filed Jan 6, 
2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Abdulmutallab_Indictment.pdf. 
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explosives hidden in his underwear.117  No damage was done to anything but 
the would-be bomber’s private parts, but the fact that a person was still able 
to board a plane post-September 11th with explosives rocked the American 
public.118  As a result, President Barack Obama issued a “Presidential 
Memorandum Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack;” a 
response much similar to his predecessors’, that required the Department of 
Homeland Security “to aggressively pursue enhanced screening technology 
consistent with privacy rights and civil liberties.”119  It is important to 
recognize that, unlike his predecessors, President Obama directed the 
Department of Homeland Security and the TSA to ensure all pursued 
security measures were consistent with the privacy rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.120 
Supposedly consistent with this presidential mandate, the TSA decided 
to implement AIT scanning units as the primary screening mechanism in 
American airports.121  Thus, the way airport screening procedures work now, 
a passenger has to remove any outer layer of clothing, belt, shoes, and 
jewelry, empty his or her pockets, and place all of the items on a conveyor 
belt for x-ray scanning.122  He or she then has to undergo AIT scanning such 
that a full-body image can be taken.123  To address the privacy concerns of 
passengers who do not wish to undergo full-body imaging, TSA policy 
allows passengers to opt out in favor of a full-body pat-down.124  A pat-down 
is an open-handed “thorough” examination performed by a TSA agent of the 
same gender—if privacy is a concern this pat-down can take place in a 
private screening area.125  No further information is provided about the 
logistics of this “thorough” pat-down investigation,126 which perhaps 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 17, at 4. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See How to Get Through the Line Faster, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/how-to-get-through-line-faster (last updated July 30, 2013). 
 123.  See supra note 110. 
 124.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 125.  Transportation Security Administration, Pat-Downs, What to Know Before You Go, TRANSP. 
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/pat-downs (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 126.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom to Travel USA in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ on the 
Merits, Redfern v. Napolitano, No. 11-1805 (argued April 4, 2013), 2012 WL 6057509, at *20 (filed 
Nov. 30, 2012) (citing A Primer on the New Airport Security Procedures, CNN TRAVEL (Nov. 23, 
2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/11/23/tsa.procedures.primer/index.html).  
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explains why, according to the TSA, 99% of passengers prefer the AIT 
scanning versus the invasive pat-down.127 
The TSA has security measures in place beyond those which passengers 
are required to physically submit to at the screening station.  In addition to 
the Secure Flight program discussed earlier,128 the TSA Visible Intermodal 
Prevention and Response teams “are broadly deployed to increase the visible 
presence of security personnel.”129  These teams are used to heighten 
perceived police presence in an airport in an effort to deter any would be 
criminals.130  Another program the TSA has in place is the Screening 
Passengers and Observational Techniques (SPOT) program, whereby 
“[t]rained officers observe passengers and look for both obvious and subtle 
suspicious behavioral indicators, like a particular vocal timbre, gestures, and 
facial movements.”131  This program is used as a profiling device to target 
passengers who exhibit seemingly suspicious characteristics.132  
All of these security measures work in tandem to ensure the safety of 
American air travel; not without backlash from the traveling public, 
however.133  When TSA announced the implementation of AIT scanning 
units as the new primary screening mechanism the protest was vociferous.134  
News networks across the country were reporting Americans’ outrage with 
intrusive full-body imaging and the new invasive pat-downs.135  Grassroots 
 
 127.  See supra note 108.  In addition, an article was recently published suggesting that the TSA 
punishes passengers who opt out through intimidation, harassment, and exacting a retaliatory wait 
time.  See Christopher Elliot, 3 Troubling Ways the TSA Punishes Passengers Who Opt Out, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-elliott/3-
troubling-ways-the-tsa-_b_2435503.html. 
 128.  49 C.F.R. pt. 1560; see supra Part I.C.1. 
 129.  Mock, supra note 28, at 218. 
 130.  Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR), TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/visible-intermodal-prevention-and-response-vipr (last updated Aug. 23, 
2013). 
 131.  Mock, supra note 28, at 218. 
 132.  Id. at 218–19. 
 133.  Stephen Clark, ‘Invasive’ Airport Screening Stirs Backlash Among Airline Passengers, FOX 
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/12/invasive-airport-screening-
stirs-backlash-airline-passengers. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  See, e.g., Phil Gast, Growing Backlash Against TSA Body Scanners, Pat-Downs, CNN 
TRAVEL (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/11/12/travel.screening/index.html; 
Editorial, The Uproar over Pat-Downs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/opinion/20sat3.html?ref=transportationsecurityadministration&
_r=0&gwh=3375F5A90024564A54440BDD5048BE70. 
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organizations called for a “National Opt Out Day,” suggesting widespread 
protest against AIT scanning at airports during the Thanksgiving season—
the busiest travel time of the year.136  Full-body imaging, full-body pat-
downs, and selective screening processes have been attacked by individuals 
and organizations across the country.137  While pre-TSA screening measures 
were eventually accepted by the American public as a permissible exception 
to constitutional privacy rights, current enhancements to airport security 
screening begs the question: are TSA screening measures constitutional?  Or 
more simply, what are passengers’ constitutional rights in the airport? 
III.  THE AIRPORT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.138 
Fourth Amendment rights are not inviolate.  Per the text of the 
Amendment, a particularized warrant supported by probable cause grants an 
exception to the government’s inability to invade one’s privacy.139  There are 
also limited circumstances in which the Supreme Court has carved out 
exceptions to the seemingly clear pronouncements of the Amendment, and 
found that certain circumstances justify government intrusion on one’s 
person and property without a warrant.140  Whenever passengers submit bags 
to x-ray screening or present themselves for full-body imaging, the 
government is undoubtedly performing a “search” as defined by the Fourth 
Amendment.141  And it is beyond dispute that the TSA does not have a 
warrant to search every person that travels by air.  The question is, therefore, 
 
 136.  Gast, supra note 135. 
 137.  Clark, supra note 133. 
 138.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (recognizing an exception for 
contraband in plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (recognizing an exception for a 
search incident to lawful arrest).  
 141.  Courts have held, however, that this does not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.  See, e.g., United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Viegas, 
639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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under which exception, if any, to Fourth Amendment protections do the 
current TSA screening procedures fall? 
A.  Pre-TSA Fourth Amendment Litigation 
Fourth Amendment litigation challenging airport security measures is 
nothing new.  Since FAA search programs were introduced in the 1960s they 
have been challenged as unconstitutional.  No federal court of appeals has 
wholesale found airport screening measures unconstitutional.142  During 
these initial challenges to new airport security measures, it became clear that 
the airport was becoming another exception to the rule.143  Early litigation 
concerning the constitutionality of airport security measures seemed to 
suggest that the Constitution, especially the Fourth Amendment, did not 
apply in equal force at airport screening stations.  This point is accentuated 
by the federal appellate courts’ inability to come to a single principled 
consensus to justify the constitutionality of airport security searches—in the 
infancy of airport litigation, courts used four primary rationales to uphold 
airport security screening: Terry reasonableness, passenger consent, the 
border search exception, and the administrative-search exception.  Despite 
the differences in rationale, however, the undergirding theme of all the early 
appellate decisions was clear: the necessity of air-travel safety justified any 
constitutional intrusion.  The following, therefore, highlights how the federal 
courts of appeals stretched to find the means to justify the end.  
1.  Terry Reasonableness 
The Fourth Circuit was one of the first courts of appeals to deal with the 
constitutionality of airport security in United States v. Epperson.144  In 
Epperson, the defendant was arrested at Washington National Airport for 
attempting to board an aircraft carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, in 
violation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472(l).145  Epperson triggered the screening 
 
 142.  But there have been occasions where the facts surrounding a particular search rendered that 
search unconstitutional.  See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
 143.  Fourth Amendment rights have been limited in other contexts too.  See New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (limiting Fourth Amendment rights in public schools); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (limiting Fourth Amendment rights in prisons). 
 144.  454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 145.  Id. at 770. 
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magnetometer, and as a result, was subjected to a frisk of his person by a 
United States Marshal.146  Upon frisking him, the marshal discovered a 
loaded .22 pistol in Epperson’s jacket pocket, resulting in Epperson’s 
arrest.147  Epperson moved to suppress the evidence of the gun, arguing that 
the use of the magnetometer was a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, violating the warrant requirement.148 
The Fourth Circuit agreed that passing through a metal detector was a 
“search” in Fourth Amendment terms, and interestingly found that the search 
by magnetometer did not fall under any of the established exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.149  Instead, the Fourth Circuit 
found that the search was justified by the then recently handed down 
Supreme Court decision Terry v. Ohio.150  Extrapolating from Terry, the 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the danger of skyjacking “is so well known, the 
governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so 
minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent national 
circumstances.”151  The Fourth Circuit went on to state that passing through a 
metal detector, “unlike frisking, cannot possibly be ‘an annoying, 
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience,’ because the person 
scrutinized is not even aware of the examination.”152  Thus, resting on the 
use of the modifier “unreasonable” in the text of the Fourth Amendment, the 
court found that a magnetometer was a limited search of minimal intrusion, 
and was therefore “reasonable” in the face of pressing national security 
interests.  The court viewed airport screening as the logical extension of a 
Terry stop and frisk.153 
Just a few months after Epperson was handed down, the Second Circuit 
was called to grapple with the constitutionality of airport security in United 
States v. Bell.154  In Bell, the defendant was stopped and frisked after he 
activated the magnetometer, which he argued was an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment.155  The court heartily disagreed and, citing 
 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 151.  Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771. 
 152.  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 25 (1968)). 
 153.  Id. at 772; accord United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 154.  464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 155.  Id. at 673. 
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Epperson, argued: “None of the personal indignities of the frisk discussed [] 
in Terry are here present.  In view of the magnitude of the crime sought to be 
prevented, the exigencies of time which clearly precluded the obtaining of a 
warrant, the use of the magnetometer is in our view a reasonable caution.”156  
Going one step further than the majority opinion, however, Judge Henry 
Friendly in a concurrence hammered home the fact that grave national 
security interests temper any Fourth Amendment protections.157  He 
proclaimed “[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a 
large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness.”158  Thus, 
in Judge Friendly’s opinion, again resting on the use of the word 
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment, national security effectively 
renders all “good faith” searches “for the purpose of preventing hijacking” 
reasonable, and therefore constitutional—and in his view, if a passenger 
does not like it “he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.”159 
In an attempt to rein in his colleague, Judge Walter Mansfield also wrote 
a separate concurring opinion, attempting to ground the Fourth Amendment 
conversation in a discussion about individual rights.160  He cautioned against 
the approach taken by Judge Friendly, arguing that although skyjacking does 
pose a grave risk to national security, vague principles of security and good 
faith cannot be used “to abandon standards that have been carefully 
constructed over the years as a means of protecting individual rights 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”161  He went on to say “[n]o necessity 
exists for punching a hole in the Fourth Amendment in order to enable the 
FAA and airline authorities to deal effectively with the air piracy 
problems.”162  Judge Mansfield presciently concluded: 
[S]hould there be any increase in the threat of hijackings, airline 
authorities, in addition to their use of existing methods described in 
the majority opinion (which are undoubtedly undergoing 
improvement and refinement on the basis of experience) may 
 
 156.  Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17). 
 157.  Id. at 674–75 (Friendly, J., concurring). 
 158.  Id. at 675 (emphasis in the original). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 675–76 (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
 161.  Id. at 675. 
 162.  Id. at 676. 
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protect themselves and the public by refusing passage to a suspected 
hijacker rather than by subjecting all passengers to the wholesale 
indignities that would be permitted in the exercise of broad powers 
of the type urged.163 
Judge Mansfield warned of what he foresaw as becoming a popular trend: 
courts exaggerating the security interests involved in preventing air piracy to 
allow the government to trample on an individual’s civil liberties.164 
2.  Border Search Exception 
Just one year after Epperson and Bell, the Fifth Circuit in United States 
v. Skipwith rejected Terry as the basis for justifying airport security.165  The 
court instead turned to the Supreme Court’s border search precedent as 
condoning the Fourth Amendment intrusions occasioned by airport security 
screening.166  Rehashing Judge Friendly’s concurrence in Bell, the court 
made sure to emphasize the pressing national security concerns that are at 
play in an airport.167  The court then looked to border search jurisprudence to 
justify its holding, finding that “those who actually present themselves for 
boarding on an air carrier, like those seeking entrance into the country, are 
subject to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion.”168  In holding 
airport searches to be constitutional border-like searches, the Fifth Circuit 
performed a three-part balancing test, weighing “public necessity, efficacy 
of the search, and degree of intrusion.”169  In conducting the test, often seen 
in the administrative-search context, the court expressed judicial concern 
with the crime of air piracy, noting “there is a judicially-recognized 
necessity to insure [sic] that the potential harms of air piracy are foiled.”170  
And because metal detectors, visual inspections, and physical searches 
appeared to be both efficacious and efficient, the then-current airport 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).  The Fifth Circuit had previously upheld case-by-case 
searches in airports.  See United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 166.  Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 169.  Id. at 1275. 
 170.  Id. 
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screening protocol passed constitutional muster.171 
3.  Administrative Search Exception 
Two weeks after Skipwith, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the notion that 
Terry justifies airport security measures in United States v. Davis.172  In that 
case, the defendant’s briefcase was opened and searched as part of a routine 
check, during the course of which a handgun was found.173  The defendant 
challenged the search as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.174  
After a lengthy recount of the then-recent phenomenon of skyjacking, the 
Ninth Circuit found that airport security screening is not per se 
unconstitutional.175  The court, however, rejected that Terry could justify 
general airport screening given that there was no particularized suspicion for 
all travelers subjected to the screening process and that the scope of airport 
screening extends beyond the measures necessary to assure a passenger does 
not have a weapon immediately available for use against the screening 
agents.176  The court reasoned that if Terry was extended “to authorize 
airport screening searches” the result would be “intrusions upon privacy 
unwarranted by the need.”177  Thus, the Ninth Circuit had to look elsewhere 
to justify airport screening in the face of pressing national security interests.  
Breaking new ground in airport security jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit 
held that screening measures were justified under the administrative search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment.178  At the time, the only way to 
examine whether a search was permissible under the administrative 
exception to the Fourth Amendment was to balance the “need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails.”179  With this standard in mind, 
the Ninth Circuit found that in light of the “grave and urgent” need to 
prevent skyjacking, airport searches could occur under the administrative 
search doctrine so long as the search is “indiscriminate” and “limited in its 
intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that 
 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 173.  Id. at 896. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 897–904. 
 176.  Id. at 907. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 908–09. 
 179.  Id. at 910 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
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justifies it.”180  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that a potential passenger 
should retain the right to leave rather than being forced to submit to the 
search.181  
4.  Consent 
Finally, some courts found that airport security screening did not raise 
any constitutional issues given that passengers consent to airport screening 
measures.  For example, in United States v. Freeland, the Sixth Circuit 
found that the search of a passenger’s bags during an airport screening 
routine could be justified under the doctrine of consent.182  Noting that there 
was a sign posted at the ticket counter that baggage would be examined, the 
court stated that once the defendant read the sign and proceeded to 
commence the screening process, he essentially consented to the search.183  
Drawing on the Supreme Court’s Bustamonte decision,184 the Sixth Circuit 
looked at the two concerns circling the question of voluntary consent: (1) the 
legitimate need for searches; and (2) the absence of coercion.185  Analyzing 
these two concerns, the Sixth Circuit found that the acute need for air 
security and the ability for a passenger to withdraw his bag from the search 
at any time satisfied the Bustamonte voluntariness requirements.186  As such, 
given a passenger’s tacit consent to airport searches, the airport security 
screening program in question did not implicate any Fourth Amendment 
rights.187 
The cases above emphasize two important points.  One, that an 
undergirding concern for national security drove the courts to find airport 
security screening measures constitutional.  All of the circuits discussed 
above went to painstaking lengths to detail the threat posed by skyjacking 
and the current danger facing the country as a precursor to their 
constitutional analysis.  Second, four distinct rationales emerged from the 
 
 180.  Id.; accord United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 181.  Davis, 482 F.2d at 912.  The court later held that a person does not always have the right to 
leave.  See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 182.  562 F.2d 383, 385–86 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 185.  Freeland, 526 F.2d at 386. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id.  Similar conclusions were also reached by other courts.  See, e.g., United States v. 
DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978). 
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courts as justification for airport security screening measures: consent, the 
border search exception, general reasonableness under Terry, and the 
administrative search doctrine.  Although the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly stepped in to explain how, if at all, airport security measures are 
justifiable under the Constitution, it is important to explore these four views 
in order to assess the constitutionality of current TSA airport screening 
measures.  
B.  Ends Justify the Means—Constitutionality of Airport Security 
If airport screening measures are in fact constitutional, then they have to 
be justified by an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  
The Supreme Court has delineated limited situations in which a government 
official is not required to get a warrant to effectuate a Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure.188  Because the Supreme Court has never officially decided 
what exception to the Fourth Amendment justifies airport searches, it is 
important to examine the four competing rationales used by the courts in 
early airport security litigation to determine which exception, if any, is true 
to precedent and passes constitutional muster. 
1.  Consent 
Despite the fact that it was cited by at least three circuits as justifying 
airport security searches, the consent exception is perhaps the easiest 
rationale to dispatch.189  Most would now recognize that requiring persons to 
choose between their constitutional right to travel190 and their Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches would be coercion, 
and therefore render consent meaningless.191  Indeed, the Supreme Court said 
 
 188.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (recognizing motor vehicle exception); Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (recognizing plain view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973) (recognizing consent exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) 
(recognizing exception for searches incident to arrest); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) 
(recognizing open fields exception). 
 189.  See DeAngelo, 584 F.2d at 47 (4th Cir. 1978); Freeland, 562 F.2d at 384 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 190.  The constitutional right to travel includes the right to travel from one state to another and the 
free use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce to do so.  United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
757 (1966). 
 191.  See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806−07 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
government cannot force passengers to choose between Fourth Amendment rights and right to 
travel); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973) (same).  These cases indicate that the 
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that it is “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be 
surrendered in order to assert another.”192  This is reinforced by the fact that 
under current airport security policies, if a person withdraws consent and 
attempts to leave a screening area, he or she can be subject to civil 
liability.193  Thus, this rationale seems to be squarely foreclosed by Supreme 
Court precedent.  For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, we can turn 
to the other constitutional doctrines used to justify airport screening’s 
infringement on Fourth Amendment rights. 
2.  Border Search Exception  
The Fifth Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s case law regarding 
border search to determine that airport security screenings were excepted 
from Fourth Amendment protections.194  While from a bird’s-eye 
perspective the analogy makes sense, a closer look at the border exception 
doctrine shows that it may not be constitutionally analogous and therefore is 
a weak justification for airport security measures. 
At the time airport security was federally implemented in airports, the 
border searches exception to Fourth Amendment protections was well 
established.  As detailed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. 
Ramsey, the Supreme Court first announced the government’s authority to 
perform border searches notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment in 1886.195  
Then in 1925 the Court laid out the constitutional difference between border 
searches and searches of persons lawfully within the country.196  The Court 
re-announced the border exception to the Fourth Amendment in light of 
recently enacted airport security measures in 1971, explaining that 
a port of entry is not a traveler’s home.  His right to be let alone 
neither  prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of . . . 
illegal [] materials . . . .  [I]t is an old practice and is intimately 
 
courts were wrong at the time they reached their conclusion. 
 192.  See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). 
 193.  See Susanna Kim, Airport Pat-Downs: TSA Says It Can Fine You for Backing Out, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/walking=airport-security-lead-11000-
fine/story?id=12215171; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1503.401(a), (b)(1) (2012) (TSA civil penalties 
provisions). 
 194.  United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 195.  431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)). 
 196.  Id. at 618 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)). 
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associated with excluding illegal articles from the country.197 
Thus, again building from the Fourth Amendment principle of 
reasonableness, border searches have been considered a reasonable 
exception to the Fourth Amendment since its inception and therefore evade 
the warrant requirement.198 
The border search precedent, primarily relied on by the Fifth Circuit in 
Skipwith, does not fit precisely with air port screening given that most 
passengers screened in airports are traveling domestically or out of the 
United States.  In creating the border exception caveat, the Supreme Court 
noted the “distinction between searches within this country, requiring 
probable cause, and border searches.”199  The border search exception was in 
large part justified by the Executive’s power to deal in foreign commerce 
and to secure the borders.200  The executive powers at play at the border are 
not implicated in domestic travel.  Thus, given the ill fit of the analogy, this 
exception too can be dispatched when assessing the constitutionality of 
airport security screening. 
3.  General Reasonableness—the Terry Stop and Frisk 
Both the Second and Fourth Circuits found airport security screening 
constitutional on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 
in which Chief Justice Earl Warren grappled with the “practical and 
constitutional arguments” concerning on-the-street police–citizen 
encounters.201  Weighing constitutional freedoms against the “rapidly 
unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets” and the police’s 
need for “an escalating set of flexible responses,” the Supreme Court 
reminded us that the police “must, whenever practicable, obtain advance 
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”202  
The Court went on, however, to carve out a new exception to Fourth 
Amendment protections—when police action is “predicated upon the on-the-
spot observations of the officer.”203  In these situations, the Court 
 
 197.  Id. (citing United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)). 
 198.  Id. at 619. 
 199.  Id. at 618. 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). 
 202.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 203.  Id. at 20. 
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commanded lower courts to look past the warrant requirement and test such 
stops, searches, and seizures against the Fourth Amendment’s “general 
proscription against unreasonable searches.”204  In a capitulation to modern 
realities, Chief Justice Warren went on to announce that police may, “in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner[,] approach a 
person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”205  And while Chief Justice 
Warren, perhaps in vain, tried to warn against infringement on individual 
rights, an officer’s ability to conduct what is now known as an investigative 
Terry stop and frisk was premised upon two principles: one, a Terry stop 
must be based on a reasonable and particularized suspicion of criminal 
activity; and two, a Terry frisk must be tailored to a search for weapons to 
ensure officer safety.206 
In basing their holding on Terry, it appears that the Second and Fourth 
Circuits forgot to the read the entire opinion.  While the Terry decision does 
use broad language concerning on-the-spot decision-making by law 
enforcement and the need to afford police discretion in performing their 
duties, the Terry opinion is not untethered to articulable principles.  While 
Terry found its genesis in the use of the word “unreasonable” in the text of 
the Fourth Amendment—for the Second and Fourth Circuits to latch onto 
Terry’s underpinnings and find that airport security satisfies a general 
standard of “reasonableness” and thus satisfies the Fourth Amendment runs 
contrary to the rest of the Terry decision.  Terry gives two clear 
commandments for justifying Terry stops and frisks—an articulable and 
particularized suspicion for performing a stop, and a search both limited and 
justified by the immediacy of officer safety.207  These two rationales are not 
present in a generalized airport security screening program.  While there 
may be certain instances where some criminal activity is afoot, this does not 
translate to the particularized suspicion necessary to search every air 
passenger under Terry.  Moreover, airport screening was not implemented 
for the safety of the officer conducting the search but for protecting the 
safety of the aircraft and the passengers onboard.208  Thus, the Terry 
 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 22. 
 206.  Id. at 27. 
 207.  Id. at 33.  
 208.  See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101(a)(1) (requiring airport security programs that “[p]rovide[] for the 
safety and security of persons and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation”). 
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justification of a search for weapons to protect the immediate safety of the 
officer performing the search does not always apply in an airport setting.  
While protecting the airplane and the passengers on board is a laudable goal 
in itself, it does not fit squarely within Terry’s justifying principles.  It seems 
clear, therefore, that airport screening measures do not satisfy the basic 
requirements outlined in Terry, allowing the government to conduct 
wholesale warrantless searches. 
More importantly, to adopt the Second and Fourth Circuits’ approach 
and justify airport security screening measures using a general standard of 
reasonableness would create an extremely slippery slope.  If an unauthorized 
government search only had to be “reasonable,” a nebulous word in and of 
itself, Fourth Amendment protections far beyond the airport would be at 
risk.  Reasonableness is subjective to the point where almost anything can be 
justified.209  Fourth Amendment safeguards would therefore hinge upon the 
discretion of the acting government official or presiding judge.  A 
constitutionally guarded reading of the Fourth Amendment therefore 
requires any warrantless search or seizure be deemed per se unreasonable 
unless it fits into one of the narrow, judge-made exceptions.210  Thus it is 
safe to dismiss Terry (or an unsupported extrapolation therefrom) as the 
basis for the constitutionality of airport screening programs.  
With three of the four rationales used to justify the constitutionality of 
airport security screening by early appellate courts now dismissed, the 
question becomes whether airport-screening measures can be justified under 
the only rationale left—the administrative search exception. 
4.  Administrative Search Exception 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld warrantless government 
searches pursuant to an administrative scheme.211  Around the time airport 
security screening was first implemented, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Biswell upheld the warrantless search of a federally licensed gun 
 
 209.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”). 
 210.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”). 
 211.  See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 
(1959). 
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dealership because the licensing statute authorized such searches.212  The 
Court noted the importance of federal efforts to regulate crime and the 
crucial interests at stake in this instance, “since it assures that weapons are 
distributed through regular channels and in a traceable manner and makes 
possible the prevention of sales to undesirable customers and the detection 
of the origin of particular firearms.”213  Again basing its conclusion on the 
use of the word “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment, the Court held 
that it has “little difficulty in concluding that where, as here, regulatory 
inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibilities of abuse and 
the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may 
proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute.”214 
Based on the Supreme Court’s administrative search jurisprudence, it is 
logical to conclude, as the Ninth Circuit did in Davis,215 that airport security 
screenings fall under this exception to the Fourth Amendment.  The urgent 
need for securing American airways justifies the government’s 
implementing a warrantless search program, especially as a warrant 
requirement would “easily frustrate inspection.”216  Thus, just as the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned, it appears that the administrative search doctrine provides a 
sound and principled rationale for upholding airport security searches 
conducted pursuant to a statutory scheme and codified regulations. 
More recent Supreme Court precedent expounding on the administrative 
search exception to the Fourth Amendment bolsters the conclusion that 
airport security screenings fall under this exception.  In the 1990 decision of 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court was called 
upon to determine the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint programs.217  
The Sitz Court applied the three-part balancing test announced in Brown v. 
Texas218 for determining the constitutionality of administrative search 
programs, weighing the state’s interest, the effectiveness of the search 
measure, and the level of intrusion on the individual’s privacy.219  
In performing the analysis, the Supreme Court looked at the state’s 
 
 212.  406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
 213.  Id. at 315–16. 
 214.  Id. at 317. 
 215.  482 F.2d 893 (1973). 
 216.  Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316. 
 217.  496 U.S. 444 (1990); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004). 
 218.  443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
 219.  Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448−49. 
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interest by emphasizing the magnitude of the drunk driving problem in 
Michigan, evidenced by statistics.220  The Court then compared this to the 
slight intrusion on motorists’ privacy caused by a brief checkpoint stop, 
where fear and annoyance is minimized by the fact that everyone is subject 
to the same search measures—there was no discretion in the program.221  
Finally, the Court looked at the effectiveness of the administrative search 
program in question, and found that empirical data resulted in the arrest of 
around 1.6% of all motorists stopped, which was statistically significant 
according to the Court’s precedent.222  In sum, the Supreme Court upheld 
blanket sobriety checkpoints under the administrative search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment so long as the checkpoint was justified by a pressing 
government interest, effectively implemented, and minimally intrusive on 
travelers’ privacy.223  In explaining what is allowable under the 
administrative search exception, the Court emphasized the minimal invasion 
on a person’s privacy interest, the fact that administrative searches are not 
susceptible to individual abuse, and that the administrative search program 
in question had proven statistically effective.224  
As further evidence that airport security screenings fall under the 
administrative search exception, all of the federal appellate cases that have 
examined the constitutionality of airport screening measures after the advent 
of the TSA have followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead in United States v. 
Davis225 and analyzed the airport security programs using the administrative 
search exception.226  In fact, the Supreme Court on three separate occasions 
has hinted that airport security checkpoints are justifiable under the 
administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment.227  Despite this, it 
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 224.  Id.  
 225.  482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 226.  See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. 
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 227.  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000) (“Our holding also does not 
affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports and government buildings, 
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Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,  675 n.3 
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is important to highlight that all federal appellate courts that have upheld 
airport security screening using the administrative search doctrine, both 
before and after the introduction of the TSA, were primarily analyzing the 
use of standard metal detectors (magnetometers) and x-ray baggage 
scanners.228  Therefore, even assuming the administrative search doctrine 
justifies airport security screening programs generally, current TSA 
screening measures differ greatly from the then-current security measures 
held to be constitutional by the courts.229  Courts must, therefore, perform 
the administrative-search balancing test using current security screening 
measures to scrutinize whether American air travelers now routinely subject 
to enhanced screening measures are being required to submit to 
unconstitutional searches. 
C.  Do Current Screening Measures Violate the Fourth Amendment? 
Even conceding that the appellate courts got it right in the 1970s, that 
airport screening programs as originally enacted were justifiably excepted 
from Fourth Amendment protections, it does not follow that the current 
enhanced screening measures are also constitutional.  There is a strong 
argument to be made that current screening measures do not satisfy the 
requirements of the administrative search exception to the Fourth 
Amendment; AIT scanning and the new, more invasive pat-downs are quite 
different from the previously employed standard metal detectors and x-ray 
baggage scanners.230  
Earlier this year, the TSA announced that it is removing at least 174 
full-body scanners that use backscatter technology from airport security 
checkpoints.231  This decision was made after the TSA concluded that 
software could not be developed to limit the intrusiveness of the machines as 
required by Congress.232  As put by Representative John L. Mica (R-Fla.), it 
was an example of “another very bad decision by TSA coming home to 
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 228.  See supra note 226. 
 229.  Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 17, at 4. 
 230.  Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 17, at 5. 
 231.  Ashley Halsey III, TSA to Pull Revealing Scanners from Airports, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-18/local/36409626_1_millimeter-wave-scanners-
administrator-john-s-pistole-full-body-scanners. 
 232.  Id. 
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roost.”233  Yet despite some AIT scanners being removed from airports, the 
scanners that use millimeter wave technology will still be in place, and the 
backscatter machines that are being removed will be placed in federal 
buildings.234  The Congressional worry surrounding AIT scanning further 
emphasizes the need for a renewed constitutional analysis of current airport 
screening measures.235  Even TSA’s general counsel’s office admitted that 
“[t]he additional capability of AIT [scanning] . . . raises novel legal and 
policy issues, particularly those related to privacy.”236 
As Chief Justice Earl Warren warned in Terry, “a search which is 
reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of 
its intolerable intensity and scope.”237  The following section analyzes 
current airport security measures using the administrative search doctrine 
test in an effort to examine the constitutionality of AIT scanning and the 
invasive pat-downs. 
1.  Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) v. Department of 
Homeland Security 
As of now, the D.C. Circuit is the only federal court of appeals that has 
examined the constitutionality of AIT scanning, which was at issue in 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) v. United States Department 
of Homeland Security.238  Outlining the history of courts upholding airport 
security screening under the administrative search doctrine, the D.C. Circuit 
proceeded to perform its own limited administrative balancing test regarding 
the use of AIT scanners and full-body imaging.239  The court found that the 
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 234.  The TSA announced that it will discontinue backscatter scanners as of May 31, 2013.  Id.; 
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 236.  Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 17, at 5. 
 237.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968). 
 238.  653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  In 2010, Jeffrey Redfern and Anant N. Pradhan brought an 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts challenging the 
constitutionality of the TSA’s screening procedures.  See Redfern v. Napolitano, No. 10-12048, 2011 
WL 1750445 (Mass. Dist. Ct. May 9, 2011).  The district court did not reach the merits, however, 
dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at *8.  Redfern and Pradhan appealed.  
See Redfern v. Napolitano, No. 11-1805, 2013 WL 3470495 (1st Cir. July 11, 2013) (holding that 
the claims have become moot as the AIT scanners were removed). 
 239.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10–11. 
[Vol. 41: 1, 2013] The Post-TSA Airport 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
37 
scales tipped in favor of the government, given that the need “to ensure 
public safety can be particularly acute.”240  The court then noted the 
increased effectiveness of AIT scanning, because unlike a metal detector, it 
can detect any liquids or powders carried on a person.241  The court 
emphasized that the TSA has taken measures to protect people’s privacy 
when using the AIT scanner, including distorting images and deleting them, 
but even “more telling,” allowing people to opt out in favor of a pat-down.242  
This one-paragraph analysis rendered it obvious to the court that AIT 
scanning does not violate the Fourth Amendment, especially, according to 
the court, given the fact that the Fourth Amendment administrative search 
exception does not require the least intrusive means of effecting a search in 
order for an administrative search program to be constitutional.243 
The D.C. Circuit’s perfunctory analysis finding AIT scanning 
constitutional is intellectually callous for a number of reasons.  First, the 
court makes no mention of the increasing intrusiveness of AIT scanning in 
that it produces nude full-body images.  Most would agree that a government 
official viewing one’s naked body is a much greater privacy intrusion than 
walking through a standard metal detector fully clothed.  Moreover, the 
court does not demonstrate how this increased intrusion is justified by any 
proportionate increase in the government’s interest.  Assuming that the 
government’s interest at stake here has been heightened by September 11th 
and subsequent terrorist attacks, the court does not even engage in analysis 
to explain the magnitude of the government’s interests.  And finally, the 
court cites no evidence whatsoever that AIT scanning has proven effective. 
244 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to AIT scanning, the 
court inadequately considered the constitutional implications, shrugging 
aside the serious privacy interests implicated.  “The opinion’s terse analysis 
of a highly contentious issue in a high-profile case speaks volumes about the 
level of deference that the TSA will receive from the courts.”245  Given that 
the D.C. Circuit did not treat the issue with the intellectual rigor it deserves, 
the following section provides an analysis of the constitutionality of AIT 
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screening measures under the administrative search exception three-part 
balancing test. 
2.  Administrative Search Analysis 
A true examination of the constitutionality of the administrative search 
program requires one to look at: (a) the government interest in question; (b) 
the effectiveness of the search measure implemented; (c) and the nature of 
the intrusion on one’s privacy.246  As reflected below, the constitutionality of 
airport security measures proves to be a much closer question than the D.C. 
Circuit would have one imagine. 
a.  Government Interest 
“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation,”247 the government interest at 
stake when airport security measures were first implemented.  In the 1970s, 
when President Nixon first announced the necessity for federally mandated 
airport security programs, the number of skyjackings in the United States 
was on the rise.248  And the stakes at the time were clear—not only does 
skyjacking endanger the lives of the people on the airplane, it also has the 
possibility of impacting hundreds, if not thousands more people on the 
ground should the plane crash.249  The worst of these risks was realized in 
the September 11th terrorist attacks.250  The American public saw firsthand 
the widespread destruction that can result from skyjackings, resulting in the 
loss of close to 3000 people.251  And given the difficulty or near 
impossibility of finding weapons or explosives absent an all-inclusive 
administrative search program, the government’s need to conduct such 
routine searches before a passenger boards a plane is now painfully acute.  
The question remains, however, how to assess the government interests at 
stake in the face of an ever-changing terrorist threat.  While September 11th 
resulted in more deaths than any other skyjacking in history, did this terrorist 
 
 246.  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 247.  Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–
58 (1966)). 
 248.  See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 250.  See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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event heighten the government interests presently at stake? 
Terrorism is by no means a recent phenomenon.252  However, since the 
1970s, terrorist organizations have become more complex and the 
technology with which to perpetrate attacks more advanced.  The world’s 
most infamous terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, came into existence in the late 
1980s.253  Today, a bomb can be created using chemical concoctions unheard 
of in the 1970s.254  An even more frightening aspect of terrorism today as 
compared to the 1970s is that a bomb can be made from a wide range of 
materials and detonated using a seemingly innocent device, such as a 
cellphone.255  Although the September 11th skyjackers overcame the planes 
using rudimentary weapons, and attempting to carry bombs on a plane has 
occurred since the 1970s,256 one could persuasively argue that the 
sophistication of terrorism today has more seriously imperiled the interests 
the government is trying to protect and defend. 
But in weighing the government’s interests, it is important to not 
overstate it.  In 1970, when airport security measures were beginning to be 
introduced, there were approximately sixty terrorist attacks against U.S. 
interests.257  In 2001, when the United States faced its most deadly terrorist 
incident, there were roughly thirty terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.258  
In 2010, when AIT scanners were introduced into American airports, the 
number of incidents of terrorism worldwide was on a decline since 
September 11th.259  In 2011, the year after the introduction of AIT scanning 
into airports, the National Counterterrorism Center reported that the number 
of terrorism-related deaths was the lowest it had been since the agency 
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began collecting comprehensive terrorism data in 2007.260  When looking at 
how Americans were impacted by terrorism in 2011, seventeen Americans 
were killed by incidents of terrorism, fourteen were injured, and three were 
kidnapped.261  Importantly, however, none of the incidents of terrorism that 
affected American citizens occurred in the United States, or the western 
hemisphere for that matter262—all of these incidents occurred in Afghanistan, 
Israel, or Iraq.263  The number of Americans affected by terrorism becomes 
even smaller when looking specifically at American deaths caused by Al-
Qaeda.  In the ten-year period after September 11th, fourteen United States 
citizens were killed by Al-Qaeda related or inspired terrorists.264  The 
likelihood of a private U.S. citizen dying as a result of a terrorist incident is 
equivalent to the likelihood of that same citizen being crushed to death by 
his or her television or furniture.265  
Although the government’s need to fight and prevent terrorist attacks in 
the United States is certainly more pressing today than perhaps it ever has 
been, it is not clear that the threat of terrorism in America is any graver than 
it was in the 1970s.  Therefore, it is not enough for the government to rely 
on the events of September 11th as being indicative of a substantially more 
pressing governmental interest justifying an increasing intrusion on 
individual privacy.  Although perhaps not fully conceptualized, the very 
results of September 11th were contemplated by the Executive and Congress 
when airport security was first introduced in the 1970s.266  It is up to the 
TSA, therefore, to show how the government interests at stake in airport 
security screening have intensified since September 11th and the attempted 
Christmas Day underwear bombing, doing more than just citing the incidents 
themselves.  Or else, as the concurrence in the en banc Ninth Circuit 
decision United States v. Aukai opined, if a search is to be found 
constitutional after September 11th, it should have also been constitutional 
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before September 11th.267  A single terrorist event does not necessarily 
change the underlying evil the government is trying to prevent.  What the 
D.C. Circuit did, allowing the government to rely on a lone terrorist event to 
justify increasing constitutional intrusion is tantamount to hanging 
constitutional freedoms on momentary apprehension.  The D.C. Circuit 
applied the Fourth Amendment with a heightened deference in the wake of 
September 11th without providing any doctrinal justification for this shift.268  
This is not and cannot be the standard used to measure the government’s 
interest when performing an administrative-search balancing test.  It is up to 
the government, therefore, to explain how the changing times have 
intensified its interests.  
b.  Effectiveness of the Search Measure Implemented 
The TSA has provided little in the way of evidence indicating how, if at 
all, AIT screening is more effective in preventing skyjacking than the 
standard metal detectors and previous search regimes used in airports.  In 
fact, in implementing the enhanced screening measures, the TSA justified its 
actions to no one—the new procedures were not established pursuant to 
formal rulemaking.269  There is no concrete record indicating that AIT 
screening measures are more effective at preventing skyjacking or detecting 
weapons.  In fact, citing national security concerns, the TSA has refused to 
make public statistical data detailing the effectiveness of its screening 
measures.270  In sum, “[t]he TSA declined to state whether the new screening 
measures (or even behavioral detection) ha[ve] identified any terrorists . . . .  
Moreover, the Governmental Accountability Office has cast doubt on 
whether the AIT would have detected the incident involving [the Underwear 
Bomber],” which prompted the widespread use of AIT scanning in the first 
place.271  Not only has there been government skepticism regarding the 
 
 267.  497 F.3d 955, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Graber, J., concurring). 
 268.  See generally Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
 269.  See generally id. at 11 (remanding in order for the TSA to conduct formal rulemaking 
procedures including holding a notice and comment period). 
 270.  Reinert, supra note 28, at 1519–20. 
 271.  Id. (citing Spencer S. Hsu, GAO Says Airport Body Scanners May Not Have Thwarted 
Christmas Day Bombing, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700649.html); see also  David Kravets, Airport ‘Nude’ 
Body Scanners: Are They Effective?, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/ 
[Vol. 41: 1, 2013] The Post-TSA Airport 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
42 
efficacy of the machines, with the chairman of the House transportation 
committee stating “[u]nfortunately, the performance hasn’t improved . . . .  
It’s at such a poor level we need dramatic changes in the whole program,” 
the costliness of AIT scanning seems to be placing a hefty and unwarranted 
burden on the American taxpayers.272 
With no established record of success, this factor cannot weigh in favor 
of the constitutionality of the current search regime.  When approving 
administrative searches, concrete evidence of effectiveness has played a 
pivotal role in the Supreme Court’s decision-making.273  And given that it is 
the TSA that is infringing on passengers’ constitutional rights, it is the 
TSA’s burden to prove that the search program currently employed is 
effective.  The fact that the TSA can see more of a passenger’s body by 
using AIT scanning does not automatically equate to greater effectiveness in 
detecting relevant contraband, despite the D.C. Circuit’s equivocation.274  
Thus, given there is nothing to indicate that AIT scanning is any more 
effective at detecting weapons and preventing skyjacking than the measures 
previously in place, this factor surely weighs against a finding of 
constitutionality. 
c.  Intrusion on Privacy 
In comparison to the government’s need to ensure security, the privacy 
interests at risk here are just as grave, if not more so.  AIT scanning shows 
images of a traveler’s unclothed body.275  The ACLU aptly refers to AIT 
scanning as a “virtual strip search.”276  And strip searches are patently 
different from other search methods.  The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
unique severity of strip searches in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. 
Redding, finding that the “subjective and reasonable societal expectations of 
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personal privacy support the treatment of [strip] search[es] as categorically 
distinct.”277  For the D.C. Circuit to give no credence to the much greater 
level of intrusion encompassed in AIT scanning and full-body imaging 
undermines its entire analysis.  Subjecting passengers of all ages, from 
infants to the elderly, to naked imaging increases the level of intrusiveness 
of TSA screening measures ten-fold, particularly given that the government 
interest has not demonstrably changed since the advent of airport security, 
and there is no evidence, empirical or otherwise, to support the use of such 
invasive measures.  It appears, therefore, in a pure application of the Brown 
administrative search balancing test, given the information available to the 
public, when it comes to AIT scanning the privacy interests infringed far 
outweigh the valid governmental interest.278 
The D.C. Circuit also justified current TSA security measures by noting 
that current security measures provide an alternative: people can opt out of 
AIT scanning in favor of a full-body pat-down, which allows a passenger to 
decide which method of government intrusion is “least invasive.”279  But as 
the TSA proudly boasts, 99% of airline passengers submit to AIT scanning 
as opposed to a full-body pat-down,280 presumably because most people feel 
that the full-body pat-down is more invasive than AIT scanning.  Indeed, 
sexual harassment complaints have been filed and criminal prosecution 
threatened as a result of TSA pat-downs.281  Clearly, full-body pat-downs 
used by the TSA go beyond a limited Terry frisk and involve an intimate 
physical search of a person’s body.  What makes pat-downs even more 
worrying is that the TSA has not explained “what body parts may be 
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touched, with what intensity, and for what duration.”282  A search in which 
an agent gropes so hard that a urostomy bag bursts, however, is clearly an 
intrusive and extensive physical search.  Moreover, this whole argument is a 
red herring.  The constitutionality of one screening measure does not 
mandate the constitutionality of another.  Thus, even if full-body pat-downs 
passed the constitutional muster of the administrative search exception, it 
does not follow that AIT scanning must also be excepted from Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
The D.C. Circuit also dismissed outright the idea that a search must be 
“minimally intrusive” in order to fall within the administrative search 
exception.283  Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s emphatic conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit requires minimal intrusiveness, mandating that an administrative 
search be “no more extensive or intensive than necessary.”284  And even 
assuming that the D.C. Circuit may be right that minimal intrusiveness is not 
a mandatory prerequisite to finding an administrative search program 
constitutional, it has often been a key reason for upholding an administrative 
search program both inside and outside the airport.285  
If a search is “minimally intrusive,” then the scales tip in the 
government’s favor when performing the balancing test, especially in the 
face of a pressing government need.286  When a search is not minimally 
intrusive, however, courts have to be exacting in performing the 
administrative search exception balancing test, as the administrative search 
doctrine is an exception, not the rule.287  Article III courts are tasked with 
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upholding the Constitution, an independent branch designed to protect 
citizen’s constitutional rights from government infringement.  For a court to 
hastily find an exception to the Constitution in the face of a search program 
that it admits is beyond minimally intrusive seems to be an abdication of the 
court’s most basic duty. 
Another wrinkle in the D.C. Circuit’s assessment of the constitutionality 
of current airport screening measures is the fact that passengers are no 
longer able to withdraw from airport searches without, at a minimum, facing 
civil liability in the form of a hefty fine.288  An important factor in the early 
appellate decisions finding airport security searches constitutional under the 
administrative search doctrine was the fact that a passenger could refuse to 
undergo the search if he or she chose to.289  Under current TSA regulations, 
however, this is no longer the case—a fact that the D.C. Circuit 
overlooked.290  And if further evidence is needed of the D.C. Circuit’s 
inadequate analysis of the privacy issues at stake, the court did not even 
tangentially reference the potential health concerns raised by AIT 
scanning291 or the possibility that current screening measures could run afoul 
of a passenger’s religious beliefs.292  
In short, there is a strong argument to be made that the use of AIT 
imaging and current airport security measures are not justifiable under the 
administrative search doctrine—the current search program is not 
“appropriately limited” given the nature of the intrusion.293  Or even if the 
current search program is constitutional, it requires serious consideration 
from the courts—preferably the highest one—given the privacy implications 
involved.  Everyone traveling by air in America is subject to a virtual strip-
search or an intensive groping.  These extremely invasive procedures cannot 
be assumed reasonable without thorough constitutional justification. 
D.  How Does Profiling Fit the Framework?  
Another issue in regards to the constitutionality of airport screening 
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programs is the use of profiling.294  The TSA openly admits that part of its 
current screening procedures includes the employ of “behavior detection 
officers.”295  These officers use specialized behavioral analysis techniques 
“to determine if a traveler should be referred for additional screening at the 
checkpoint.”296  TSA behavior detection officers engage in “chat downs” to 
determine if a person should be subject to enhanced screening.297  However, 
a number of people, mostly racial and ethnic minorities, complain that they 
are being unfairly profiled by this security measure.298  This profiling led 
TSA officials in Logan International Airport to file an official complaint 
about the behavior detection program, with one officer lamenting “[t]he 
behavior detection program is no longer a behavior-based program, but it is 
a racial profiling program.”299  As a result of the complaints, TSA agents 
were “retrained” in behavioral-detection analysis to alleviate any fears that 
racial profiling was occurring.300  But with no actual information on what 
behavior-detection analysis entails, questions arise as to the constitutionality 
of such a security measure. 
In Reid v. Georgia, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Terry 
stop in an airport by the Drug Enforcement Administration based solely on 
the fact that the defendant fit a “drug courier profile.”301  The Court held that 
“[a]lthough there could . . . be circumstances in which wholly lawful 
conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot,” this 
was not such a case because the defendant’s simple matching of a drug 
courier profile did not amount to a particularized and articulable suspicion 
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necessary to conduct a Terry stop.302  This type of profiling, without 
individualized suspicion, allows for the possibility of discretionary 
government harassment, in clear contravention of the Fourth Amendment. 
The TSA’s behavior detection program similarly risks violating the 
constitutional bounds of Terry.  It is almost inevitable that a prolonged 
“chat-down,” which has a singularly investigative purpose, classifies as a 
Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, each and every “chat-
down” has to be justified by a particularized suspicion of criminal activity.303  
Chat-downs cannot fall under the broader administrative search exception to 
the Fourth Amendment because they involve the use of government 
discretion, and the use of discretion necessarily brings a search program 
outside the ambit of the administrative search exception.  There could, 
therefore, be many instances in which these chat-downs are not supported by 
a particularized suspicion, thus violating the Fourth Amendment.  This is 
especially the case given that the TSA has not, again in the name of national 
security, divulged what officers are actually looking for when performing 
behavior detection analyses.  This lack of transparency is especially 
troubling when persons’ constitutional liberties are at risk of being violated.  
Like AIT scanning, behavioral detection screening potentially violates 
targeted travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights.304 
E.  Why Does it Even Matter?  
The above Fourth Amendment arguments may seem largely academic.  
It could be that many believe the D.C. Circuit’s approach—that the 
government can take the necessary steps to ensure September 11th never 
happens again—is the appropriate way to analyze airport security.305  But it 
is important to look at the precedent this approach would set.  Even if airport 
security is eventually found to be constitutional by the courts, without 
rigorously testing the constitutionality of the measures currently in place, the 
resultant implications could be far-reaching for other areas of everyday life.  
For example, one major concern about blindly rubber-stamping airport 
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security programs is the fact that it allows one event to justify constitutional 
intrusion.  Such precedent encourages hysterical decision-making.  The 
Legislative and Executive Branches are subject to political pressure; 
therefore, the decisions they make are often dictated by public sentiment.  It 
is not surprising that both of these governmental bodies would react strongly 
and perhaps rashly to ensure public confidence in a time of crisis.  Courts, 
on the other hand, are the constitutional constant of American democracy.  It 
is the job of the courts to guarantee that the democratic system remains 
tethered to the principles of the Constitution and the compact that it 
represents between “We the People.”  For courts to reach a decision 
justifying the curtailment of constitutional rights solely based on sentiments 
about modern-day events, with no further justification, is tantamount to the 
courts abandoning their constitutional function. 
Moreover, as technology advances so will the ability for the government 
to effectively search a person or their belongings, leading to the logical 
question of where one draws the line.  Even though a search may be 
effective, it does not follow that it is constitutional.  A plurality of the 
Supreme Court expressed this very sentiment, stating that in the face of 
evolving technology, “we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.’”306  Better technology alone cannot and should not justify 
suppressing constitutional rights—just because something may be more 
effective, does not always mean it should be widely implemented.  
Another problem with blindly allowing the TSA to go forward with its 
security program is its use of profiling.  Immediately following the 
September 11th terrorist events, public sentiment favored the profiling of 
people appearing to be Muslim or of Middle-Eastern descent.307  According 
to a Gallop Poll taken less than two weeks after September 11th, 49% of 
Americans supported the practice of forcing Arabs or Arab-Americans to 
carry special identification and 58% supported requiring Arabs to undergo 
more security checks at airports.308  In a Los Angeles Times poll, 68% of 
respondents said that law enforcement should be allowed to randomly stop 
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people who fit the profile of suspected terrorists.309  It seems public opinion 
was cemented in TSA policy, as just last year TSA agents complained they 
were being trained to target ethnic and religious minorities.310  To allow this 
form of profiling, with no justification, legitimates profiling in other 
situations.  It reinforces law enforcement officers targeting African-
Americans or Latinos based on nothing more than race, socio-economic 
status, or location.311  It even signals to policy-makers, e.g. those in Arizona 
that passed S.B. 1070,312 that it is acceptable to pass laws permitting 
profiling if the profiling is employed to combat a “pressing” problem, such 
as illegal immigration.  Profiling is repugnant to the ideal of Americans’ 
constitutional entitlement to “equal protection of the laws.”313 
 In short, exaggerating the government’s interest to justify current 
airport security measures is an abuse of the early reasonableness standard 
used by courts to justify airport security measures—where the urgent needs 
of airport security justified just about any search mechanism in spite of the 
Fourth Amendment.  These arguments, while tempting in certain instances, 
could lead to absurd results.  In passing child pornography laws, the 
government noted its strong interest in curbing the distribution of child porn 
in a digital age314—could that justify the “administrative search” of every 
email sent in America?  Why shouldn’t airport screening regimes extend to 
subway systems, bus terminals, and train systems?  Surely the need to ensure 
security is just as pressing in these contexts.  Can the government monitor 
everyone’s communications both sent and received to ensure someone is not 
a terrorist or involved in terrorist activities?  The parade of horribles is 
potentially endless.  This is not to say that current airport security measures, 
as a matter of certainty, violate the Fourth Amendment.315  It is saying, 
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however, that if the airport security measures are challenged as 
unconstitutional, given that they infringe on basic Fourth Amendment rights, 
those challenges should be taken seriously.  And until courts adequately 
assess the constitutionality of the intrusions occasioned by the TSA’s AIT 
scanning, invasive pat-downs, and new behavioral detection measures, 
people have, will, and should continue to challenge the constitutionality of 
such measures.316 
The prospect of challenging the constitutionality of airport screening 
measures necessarily bleeds into another question of constitutional rights: 
First Amendment protections in the airport.  
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE AIRPORT 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.317 
As people challenge the constitutionality of TSA screening measures, 
First Amendment rights will inevitably be implicated.  As soon as the TSA’s 
new search measures were announced, organizations urged citizens to 
protest against them.318  “Opting out” became a popular measure of protest, 
where travelers would forgo AIT scanning in favor of the pat-down, hoping 
to slow down the screening process.319  Civil rights organizations like the 
ACLU were gathering complaints, contemplating what future action the 
organization could take against TSA screening measures.320  And travelers 
have made fliers and placards, and have worn slogan-bearing T-shirts and 
Scottish kilts (sans underpants, of course), all in protest of TSA’s new 
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screening measures.321  There are even numerous blogs dedicated to stopping 
the use of full-body image scanning in airports.322 
But perhaps the most (in)famous and shocking method of protest is 
people showing TSA agents the nude images they see using AIT scanners in 
the flesh—naked protests have become increasingly common in the 
airport.323  In Portland, Oregon, John Brennan stripped down to his birthday 
suit before he walked through an AIT scanner in protest of what he called 
TSA’s “harassment.”324  He was arrested for his protest.325  Aaron Tobey, a 
twenty-one-year-old college student, stripped down to skimpy running 
shorts in a Richmond, Virginia airport, revealing the Fourth Amendment 
written on his chest to proclaim his protest of AIT scanning.326  He too was 
arrested.327  In Manchester, New Hampshire, a woman stripped to her 
lingerie and passed out fliers in protest of TSA screening measures.328  And 
“Bikini Girl,” Corinne Theile, has worn her swimsuit on at least seven 
flights in protest of the TSA.329  
The First Amendment declares that the government cannot abridge a 
person’s “freedom of speech,” or infringe on his or her right to “petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”330  It appears, however, that John 
Brennan and Aaron Tobey were arrested for doing exactly what the First 
Amendment allows—protesting against government policies.331  Therefore, 
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as people continue to push back against TSA screening measures and AIT 
scanning, it is important to explore what First Amendment protections exist 
in the airport. 
A.  First Amendment in the Airport 
The Supreme Court has established that an airport is a nonpublic forum 
for First Amendment purposes.332  The Court reasoned that neither history 
nor purpose indicates that an airport terminal should have all the protections 
flowing from the designation of a locale as a public forum.333  Further, the 
Court did not find it persuasive that “transportation nodes,” such as bus and 
train stations, often serve as centers for expressive activity.334  Instead the 
Court found that airports are different.335  Airports have security measures 
that do not have a parallel with other means of public transportation, airports 
restrict public access to certain areas, and importantly, “airports are 
commercial establishments” and thus must provide “services attractive to the 
marketplace.”336  The purpose of an airport, therefore, is not to promote the 
“free exchange of ideas,”337 but instead, airport terminals are dedicated to 
ensuring safe and “efficient air travel.”338  As such, unlike a traditional 
public forum, such as a public sidewalk, where restriction on speech is 
subject to strict scrutiny, restrictions in an airport must only satisfy a general 
standard of “reasonableness.”339   
Although restrictions on speech in an airport only need to satisfy a 
general standard of reasonableness, restrictions cannot be all-encompassing.  
And even though the TSA has wide latitude to restrict speech in an airport, 
any restrictions implemented cannot be in “an effort to suppress expression 
merely because [the TSA] oppose[s] the speaker’s view.”340  Thus, in an 
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airport, the Supreme Court has specifically held that “nondisruptive 
speech—such as the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a political 
message—may not be ‘airport related,’ but is still protected speech even in a 
nonpublic forum.”341  And because nondisruptive speech is protected in an 
airport, the TSA cannot retaliate against a traveler for engaging in this form 
of expression, as that would chill an individual’s exercise of his or her First 
Amendment rights, in clear contravention of the Constitution.342 
Underscoring the First Amendment’s role in airport security protesting, 
an Oregon court recently held that a man stripping naked to protest AIT 
scanning was protected speech.343  On April 7, 2012, at Portland 
International Airport, fifty-year-old John Brennan stripped naked in protest 
of AIT scanning.344  As a result, Brennan was charged with violating a 
number of city ordinances all relating to indecent exposure.345  Following a 
1985 Oregon Court of Appeals decision, the Multnomah County Circuit 
Court dismissed the charges against Brennan, finding that in Oregon, nudity 
laws do not apply in moments of protest, and as a result, “it is the speech 
itself that the state is seeking to punish.”346  Under Oregon law, Brennan’s 
nude protest, as a method of speech, was protected in the airport.347  This is 
not to say, however, that in every airport a person can bare all in protest of 
the TSA.  Brennan luckily happened to be in Portland, Oregon, a city that 
considers itself a bastion of free speech and is very familiar with nude 
protesting.348  In other cities and states, however, law enforcement can 
lawfully arrest someone for baring all at the airport, and the Supreme Court 
has held that First Amendment retaliation does not lie where there is a lawful 
arrest.349  Moreover, TSA regulations allow for a person to be fined should 
they disrupt or interfere with the screening process, as naked protest may.350  
Therefore, it is important to parse what methods of protest are allowed in 
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airport screening areas under TSA regulations; going “full-monty” will not 
be successful for everyone. 
B.  First Amendment and TSA Regulations 
The TSA cannot wholesale ban political speech in an airport, suppress a 
traveler’s views solely because it disagrees with them, or retaliate against a 
passenger for expressing her views, even though it is a nonpublic forum.351  
Reading the Supreme Court’s pronouncements together, limited protest in an 
airport is protected so long as it is nondisruptive.  As outlined earlier, the 
TSA has a number of regulations describing what is and is not allowed in an 
airport terminal.352  In addition to expressly excluding weapons and 
contraband at any point beyond an airport screening area,353 TSA regulations 
essentially prohibit any interference with TSA agents performing their 
security duties or delaying or generally disturbing a TSA screening 
process.354  The breadth of these Regulations is astonishing.  At first blush, 
there is nothing in TSA regulations outside the proscription on contraband 
that signals to a traveler what is and is not allowed in an airport screening 
area.  It appears that under its regulations, TSA agents have broad discretion 
to determine when the regulations are being violated, as often times what is 
considered “disruptive” or what causes “delay” is a subjective and fact-
intensive determination.  These regulations do not bode well for people 
wishing to protest against the constitutionality of airport security screening 
measures in the actual airport, as it appears TSA agents can justify the 
suppression of protest under the sweeping TSA regulations currently in 
force.  
As of this writing, the overall constitutionality of TSA regulations has 
only been tested once in the federal courts of appeals.355  In Rendon v. TSA, 
the Sixth Circuit was called upon to assess the constitutionality of 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1540.109, which “prohibits any person from interfering with, assaulting, 
threatening, or intimidating screening personnel in the performance of their 
screening duties.”356  Rendon, caught up in the frustration of running late for 
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his flight, was delayed at the screening station after setting off the metal 
detector.357  Unsurprisingly, Rendon progressed from anxious to angry to 
belligerent, spouting profanities at the TSA screening agents.358  As a result, 
a TSA supervisor pulled Rendon aside and told him he was being 
“uncooperative, unruly, and using loud profanities.”359  Airport police 
subsequently removed him from the screening area, and the TSA eventually 
assessed a civil fine against him for violating the above regulation.360 
Rendon attempted to challenge the regulation facially and as applied, 
arguing that it violates First Amendment free speech protections.361  The 
Sixth Circuit disagreed, finding that the regulation here was a content-
neutral regulation narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s substantial 
interest of efficiently and effectively screening for weapons.362  Moreover, 
because the regulation only prohibits conduct that poses “an actual 
hindrance to the accomplishment of a specified task,”363 it is not 
constitutionally overbroad.  Finally, in rejecting Rendon’s vagueness 
challenge to the statute, the Sixth Circuit found that because the regulation 
does not reach a “substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct” 
it “is not impermissibly vague in all its applications,” thus failing a facial 
challenge.364  In short, Rendon’s civil penalty stood, and his constitutional 
challenge to the TSA regulation—both as applied and facially—failed.365 
Given the fact that courts generally construe regulations and statutes 
against a finding of overbreadth, and will read constitutionally-saving 
restrictions into a statute when it is challenged on its face, it appears a 
successful challenge to TSA regulations will rest on an “as-applied” 
challenge.  There may be instances, therefore, that persons who engage in 
protected behavior in a screening area, such as peaceful protest, are cited for 
violating TSA regulations.  In these instances, the regulations could 
(perhaps) successfully be challenged as unconstitutional as applied.  
However, challenging the constitutionality of TSA regulations is not the 
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only way to test First Amendment protections in an airport screening area.  
There is also the potential for retaliation claims if passengers engaging in 
protest believe they are being targeted for the message they are trying to 
convey, as opposed to any regulations or law they are supposedly violating. 
C.  First Amendment Retaliation Claims 
As noted by the TSA’s Office of the General Counsel, retaliation claims 
may be the new legal frontier to combat overzealous TSA agents.366  As of 
this writing, however, only one First Amendment retaliation claim against 
TSA screening agents has made it up to the federal courts of appeals.367  In 
Tobey v. Jones, a twenty-one year-old college student was traveling from 
Virginia to Wisconsin to attend his grandfather’s funeral.368  Under the then-
current TSA screening policies, passengers were screened using standard 
metal detectors, with certain passengers selected for enhanced screening 
using AIT scanners.369  Tobey, in accordance with the national trend of the 
time, believed that AIT scanning was unconstitutional.370  Just in case he 
was selected for enhanced screening, therefore, Tobey wrote an abridged 
version of the Fourth Amendment on his bare chest to reflect his sentiments 
on the constitutionality of AIT scanning.371  His body art did not go to waste, 
as the TSA selected him for enhanced screening.372  Before he entered the 
AIT scanner Tobey removed his pants and stripped off his shirt, leaving him 
in skimpy running shorts, revealing the Fourth Amendment on his chest.373  
The TSA inquired as to Tobey’s “bizarre” behavior, to which Tobey 
responded that he was protesting.374  As a result, the TSA agents radioed the 
local police to come and arrest Mr. Tobey.375  Tobey sued the TSA agents 
under Bivens376 for civil damages.377 
 
 366.  See Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 17, at 8. 
 367.  Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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 376.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents for the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 (1971). 
 377.  Tobey, 706 F.3d at 384. 
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Although the Fourth Circuit reviewed the complaint to decide whether it 
stated a cognizable First Amendment claim and therefore did not reach the 
merits of the dispute, the court found that Tobey may have an actionable 
First Amendment claim should the facts as he alleged them prove true.378  
The court reasoned that nonviolent, silent, nondisruptive messages of protest 
are protected in the airport screening area, such that a person cannot be 
retaliated against for displaying such a message.379  Perhaps more 
importantly for persons who wish to exercise their rights of protest going 
forward the court found that this principle was clearly established, such that 
if retaliation for protest is found the TSA agents can be held personally 
liable.380  Out of the abundance of caution, however, the court emphasized 
that if Tobey was in fact being disruptive or causing an interruption, the 
TSA agents could be justified in their response given the nature of airport 
screening and the dangers faced.381  Moreover, the court also required Tobey 
to prove going forward that his arrest was solely motivated by his protected 
expression.382  Thus, the Fourth Circuit greatly restricted the scenarios in 
which an airport protester could hold TSA agents personally liable under a 
retaliation theory.  And given the nature of qualified immunity and the 
protections it affords, in most situations it will be hard for a plaintiff to 
successfully hold the TSA agents liable for violating her First Amendment 
rights. 
The limited case law accentuates one important point: As passengers 
continue to the test the constitutionality of airport screening measures, 
specifically AIT scanning and invasive pat-downs, their expression of 
dissent is not limited to filing a complaint after the search has ensued or 
blogging about it once the alleged constitutional violation has occurred.383  
Passengers are able to protest in real time, so long as TSA regulations and 
local laws are followed.  And if passengers truly engage in nondisruptive, 
nonviolent protest and as a result are cited for violating TSA regulations, the 
regulations can be challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on the 
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passenger’s First Amendment rights.  Moreover, if the passenger is seized 
solely for his or her silent, nonviolent, nondisruptive message of protest, 
then a civil suit may survive qualified immunity such that TSA agents can be 
held personally liable if their actions were in retaliation for the protected 
expression. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While aviation security is undoubtedly important, we must be 
diligent in protecting the rights of all Americans, such as their 
freedom from being subjected to humiliating and intrusive searches 
by TSA agents, especially when there is no obvious cause . . . .  It is 
important that the rules and boundaries of our airport screening 
process be transparent and easily available to travelers so that 
proper restraints are in place on screeners.  Travelers should be 
empowered with the knowledge necessary to protect themselves 
from a violation of their rights and dignity.384 
—Senator Rand Paul 
 
The relationship between the airport and the Constitution is 
complicated.  On one hand, there is a potential situation where thousands of 
people can be affected by a single lapse in security.  On the other hand, 
constitutional rights are supposed to be at their strongest in times of peril.  
The Fourth and First Amendments have an especially important role in 
guaranteeing the citizenry’s free movement in society.  Allowing single 
instances of terror to shape constitutional rights, especially First and Fourth 
Amendment rights, holds constitutional freedoms hostage to anyone wishing 
to do harm.  This also gives the government, in the name of safety, the 
permission to restrict constitutional freedoms, as persons subject to the 
restrictions stand idly by—pacified, or even worse paralyzed by fear.  This 
cannot be how constitutional rights develop.  
The Fourth Amendment’s text is very clear, that we are to be free from 
unreasonable searches or seizures, and to effectuate a search or seizure the 
government has to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause.  While 
courts have carved out exception after exception from Fourth Amendment 
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freedoms, these exceptions may have been misappropriated in an effort to 
justify airport security.  The First Amendment is equally clear; the 
government cannot suppress a citizen’s expression of disdain for 
governmental policies solely because it disagrees with it.  Yet overbroad 
regulations and little operational guidance have given the TSA wide latitude 
to potentially fine people or effectuate an arrest based on a passenger’s 
dissent and nothing more. 
Ultimately, given the importance of air travel to everyday American life, 
the Supreme Court should explain the contours of the Constitution in the 
airport, which it has thus far refused to do.385  This would give both 
passengers and security personnel notice of what is or is not acceptable in 
the airport setting.  As long as this area lies in constitutional limbo, however, 
or courts give the founding document mere lip service in its application, 
rights are left unsettled, which in turn leads to potential abuse.  Furthermore, 
the potential for abuse and increasing infringement on air passengers’ 
constitutional rights is heightened by ever-evolving technology.  As it 
becomes easier to effect a search it is increasingly important to ensure that 
the search meets the strictures of the Constitution.  Until courts take a more 
serious look into this issue however, one must assume the Constitution 
applies in equal force in the airport, just as it would anywhere else.  
Therefore, the power is in the hands of the people to push back against 
enhanced screening measures to ensure that seeming constitutional 
violations do not go unnoticed.  If courts are just going to rubber-stamp the 
government’s abrogation of travelers’ constitutional rights, then they should 
just tell the TSA to hang a sign at every airport that reads: “The Constitution 
does not apply here.” 
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